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CHAPl'ER I 
THE COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR 
The Amerioan Civil War and its aftermath was one of the great _turing 
prooesses in the history of the United States. This was. in a great part. 
due to the shooks and stresses it applied to our federal systaB ot cheoks 
aDd balanoes. During the period from 1861 to 1873 these latter -nre 
strained to the furthest bounds of their flexibility. 
The best known historical examples of this situation were the assump-
tion of unparalleled executive power by President Linooln during the war. 
and, of oourse, the oelebrated "rule of Congress" in the Reoonstruotion per-
iod following. 
During both these periods .... have the third arm of government, the 
judioial, subjected in turn to the pressure of the other two. It was oer-
tainly the most diffioult time in the history of the Supreme Coart. For 
tlat body it was a period of almost oontinual oensure trom one group or 
another, and, most partioularly, from the people themselves. 
It d..,.olved on the Coart during this time to interpret and regulate the 
political ohanges wrought by the tremendous sooial upheaval of the war and 
its aftermath. To do this it had no ohoioe but to follow its acoepted judi-
oial funotion. and use as its "yardstiok" the Constitution and the body of 
preoedent built upon it. 
1 
2 
It _s fortunate for the oountry that, exoept for a ff!Jf( notable exoep-
tions, the Suprellle Court did just this, tor in 80 doing it remained the only 
group dispassionate enough to resist the politioal exoesses of the period. 
Because ot this, as has been stated, it was maligned even by those whom it 
_s most trying to proteot. The _jority ot the people very often were 
swept along in the passions of _r and reorimination, and oonsidered, as did 
its ohiet opponents, that the Court _s a reaotionary roadblook to progress 
that should be removed. 
Allot this had its etfeot on the Court. While our body of law oame 
out of the oonfliot relatively unscathed, the Supreme Court itself be08Jlle 
somewhat tarnished in the prooess. This, as we shall 8ee, was due, in the 
main, to its own -enforoed prudenoe" a.n4 to its oooasional attempts to deoide 
issues on their political rather than judioial merit. 
In the period immediately prior to the Civil War the Court had its 
first taste ot the whips of publio sentiment that were to oome. Sinoe the 
Dred Soott Deoision in 1857 it had been unoeasingly oasti~ted by the north-
I 
ern press as a "southern court." In point ot faot, it could be so aonsid-
ered as tive ot its nine justices were ot soutl:lern antecedents; Chief Jus-
tioe Roger Taney and Associate Justioes Jolm Catron, Peter Daniel, James 
Wayne, and John CBJIlpbell.2 Considering the population trends this was an 
-------_ ...... _--
1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States Histo17' 2nd. ed., 
Little, Brown andcomp&ny, Boston,1937, II, 358. 
2 !!!. Chicago Daill!!!! Almanao, 1946, 275-6. 
3 
untair situation made particularq repugnant because of the rampant section-
a11am of the pr ...... r years. 
The situation had developed through the practioe of making new appoint-
ments to the Court from the same looale-even from the same state1.s the 
appointee t s predecessor. The states involved jealously guarded this privi-
lege, aDd this. naturally. allowed no opportunity for newer seotions of the 
oount~ to be represented. Because of this, somewhat of an injustioe was 
worked on the judges of the northern cirouit who were foroed to administer 
JIlIloh larger areas than their southern colleagues. It was not until 1863 that 
this situation was partially remedied with the ereotion of a new oircuit and 
the appointment of Stephen J. Field as a tenth justice. 
The situation was eased shortly before hostilities began. Justice 
Daniel died in 1860 and justice Campbell resigned the following year tc 
cast his lot with the Confederacy. Although these ..... cancies were certain to 
be filled b7 northern men there .... re still mrmurmgs against the Court aa 
constituted. Catron of Tenneasee and Wayne of Georgia together with Chief 
Justice Taney remained loyal to the Union, but their presence, particularly 
that of the Chief Justioe, was viewed with suspicion in the North. As late 
as 1861 the !!! ~ Courier _s commenting acrid17 on the make-up of the 
Court: "The Court, as, now arranged, is scandalously sectional, grossly 
partial, a mocke~ of the Constitut~on, a serf of the slave power, and a 
disgrace to the count~."3 
----...... _-------
3 Hew York Courier, Janua~ 22, 1861, cited in Warren. II. 359-60. 
---........ -
The appointments ot President Linooln, however, ohanged the Court to 
such an extent as to lay to rest the cry ot sectionalism. During his term 
of office, Linooln was in the unusual position ot being able to appoint tiTe 
men to the Court. Noah Swayne, Samuel J. Miller, David Davis, Stephen Field, 
and Taney's suooessor as Chiet Justioe, Salmon P. Chase.4 In ordinary times, 
this would be tantamount to a President appointing his own Suprae Court 
but the oritioal period following the war nullitied any unity ot ideas that 
the appointments made by one man might be presumed to haTe. Lincoln's 
appointees never voted as a unit exoept, of course, in unanimous rulings. 
Field, and later Chase, proved to be ot independent and somewhat volatile 
natures, and generally went their own unprediotable .. ys. 
The regretful and regretted departure ot Justice C8lIlpbell ooupled with 
another death, that ot Justioe MoLean, lett two more vacanoies tor Lincoln 
to till, and inoreased the mnddle the Court tound itselt in due to the .. r. 
The seoeding states had taken with them two judioial oirouits, and the Court 
was in need ot thorough re-organization. The President held ott the appoint-
ments ot Miller and Davis until this should be aocomplished, but .. s toroed 
to appoint Swayne immediately because, in addition to the vaoanoie., Catron. 
and Taney were in ill health and the Court _s praotioally decimated tor 
5 business pttrposes. Swayne's appointment was to be a unifying mea'811re as 
well. President Buchanan had tried to appoint as suooessor tor Justice 
-_.----.,-----.. _ .. 
4 See Appendix, i. 
5 Warren, II, 318. 
5 
Daniel, a prominent attorney, Jeremiah S. Blaok, but was defeated by the 
nOW' dominant Repablicans who bad gained control of Congress after the depar-
ture of its southern members. .A.ny nominee of Buchanan's was distasteful to 
the Republicans per .!!, and they reasoned, as well, that their om sucoess-
f'ul candidate should make the appointment. After Linooln's inauguration it 
was rumored he favored Senator Jolm J. Crittenden for the position. This 
oreated a flurry among the RePllblicans for although Crittenden was e ain-
ent &Dd respeoted legislator, his compromise proposal to the South did not 
please the more extreme party members, particular17 in view of the southern 
"flavor" of the Court.6 
The death of Justice MoLean enabled Linooln to appoint a Dew justioe 
without upsetting the vested privileges of the states in the Court, Swayne 
being from Ohio as was his predeoessor. The redistribution of the Court 
cirouits was fi_117 aooomplished in 1862 although it took Congress prao-
tical17 the whole session to oomplete it. The House and the Senate bad 
adopted different plans ed were not reoonciled until the Aot of Reor~iza-
tion was final17 passed on Ju17 15th. The dela7 was caused ohiefl7 by 
rivalries in the Senate over the vacant positions in the Court. Attem.pts 
were made to frame the oirouits in suoh a way as to inorease (or decrease) 
the ohanoes of a partioular Senator to obtain appointment. For example, 
Senators Browning of Illinois and Doolittle of Wisoonsin Were bitter rivals 
for a justioeship. As there was opposition to both men, the Eighth Cirouit 
-----... --........ _ .. 
6 Ibid., 364. 
-
6 
_s re-organised so as to inolude the states ot both. This oreated a stand-
oft as eaoh was strong enough to blook the other, and the position _a 
tinally tilled by an outsider, David Davis of Illinois who was a peraonal 
triend ot the President. In like manner. the ambitions ot Seoretary ot the 
Interior Caleb Smith ot Ohio .ere stymied by giving the newly appointed 
Justioe Swayne the oirouit inoluding Ohio, thns preoluding Smith's appoint-
., 
m.ent. 
Something should be said at Linooln's appointments. In addition to 
being notable as tar aa their nUDlber, they set a preoedent tor future ohiet 
executives to tollow, in that they' were priarily politioal and personal. 
This is not to _y that no President prior to Linooln bad never done the 
same. Certainly a an's politios lad always been important in considering 
his appointment and oonf'irmation. The ohiet point is that Lincoln apparently 
put personal loyalty ahead ot judioial ability and experienoe. Three ot 
his tive appointments, Swayne, Killer, and Cbase, bad never sat in a court. 
Swayne had been a United States District Attorney and Chase a governor and 
cabinet offioer. Miller in great measure owed his appointment to his part 
in organizing the Republioan party in 10-.. Trained as a physioian, he 
ended up being a highly sucoesstul lawyer but had never held a publio otfice 
other than aa a Justice of the Peace in Kentuc~.8 
--.-...... ----_ ... -
., Hew York Tribune, July 4, 1863. 
---------
8 Cortes A.. M. Ewing, The JUdgiSM~ the Su~e_ Court; A S:UdY of Their 
Sualifications, University 0 . esota ~e.s, ilin:D.eapol s, 1938, 98-106. 
-1 
Poasibly the oritioal national situation played a great part in Linooln'. 
ohoioe of men. During the Civil War loyalty to the government and political 
sympathies would aeem. to be m.ore important than great judioial ability' and 
independenoe. In searohing for a suooessor to Taney in 1864, the President 
f'rankly stated, "We wish f'or a Chief' Justice who will sustain ",)at )as been 
done in regard to emanoipation and the legal tenders ••• "9 Obviously, the 
Supreme Court was expeoted to uphold the actions of the government. 
This new interpretation of judioial funotion was, of' oourse, not favor-
ably reoeived by the older justioes. At the beginning of the war thB,y still 
oonstituted a -.jority, nUlll'bering Taney, Catron, WlLyne, Samuel Nelson, 
Nathan Clifford, and Robert Grier. Taney and Grier, in partioular, were 
loath to let the legislative and exeoutive branohes of the government take 
over oonstitutional interpretation, whioh seemed to be the trend. Taney 
died during the wa:r after "fighting windmills" in the person of Linooln, but 
Grier oontinued through the Reoonstruotion period and became one of the 
bitterest opponents of Congress. 
At the opening of the Civil War, the Court was surveyed uneasily by the 
oountry. The stl1l undeoided status of slavery was one cause. The infamous 
Dred Soott O&se was stUl well remembered and concern was expressed over 
tuture deoisions on slavery. It was even suggested that the Court oonsider 
slavery as a polltioal question and thus outside their soope. It never went 
_ ... _------_ ... _-
9 Warren, 400. 
8 
any further 1n3an the suggestion stage but it is interesting to note how 
early developed a teclmique that was used constantly during the Reconstruo-
tion period to check the Court. At the time the issue was settled in the 
case of Freeman Ta. HOwe, 24 Howard 450, the Supreme Court decided it must 
-
be the judge of its own jurisdiction.10 
In the main, the Court upheld 'tihe "executive aots" of the President in 
the conduct of the war. Undoubtedly, the fact of war, actual and quite 
apparent at all times, made the Court realize the folly of quibbling too 
1II1ch over constitutional interpretation. The early successes of the Confed-
erates ~pressed on ever,yone the need for drastio action, and, wherever pos-
sible, the Court gave the President the broa.dest possible latitude. The 
Court theor,y behind this was expressed in Bank of Commerce vs. Hew York, 
--- ---
2 Blaok 620, in 1863. In this oase the Court ruled that state taxing or 
bank oapital consisting of United States bonds _s illegal, that 1t was 
Ita derogation of power to borrow money, a vital funotion and :means of supply-
ing resources for peaoe and war exigencies •• 11 This "derogation of power" 
idea 1I8.S the basis of all the decisions upholding the actions of the govern-
mente 
One of the most interesting applications of practicality and expediency 
ruling over the theoretical came in the so-called Prize Cases. These grew 
out of the Federal blockade of Southern ports and called on the Supreme 
Court to decide on aspects of international law. The situation had been 
---~----.. ------
10 ~., 361. 361-8. 
11 Cited in warren, II, 384. 
9 
4 
oGSplicated b.Y the proclamation ot Secretar,y ot State Seward that DO war 
existed; that the actions ot the Confederacy' oon.tituted mereq an inaur-
reotion. Hi. position is ead17 understood. Aa long as the United States 
considered it that. ~ intervention b.1 a toreign power to aid the rebel. 
W01lld b. considered an act ot war against our gO'V'e1"llllent. While there ..... 
sympatlV' in England and France tor the South. .....n to the extent ot turnish-
ing them aasistance. neither countl"7 partioularly wished to risk a war with 
the United States to do it. This waa not out ot tear ot the Un10n govern-
aent as lIIl1ch as it was out ot respect tor the teelings ot their own people. 
In England. especiallr, the bulk ot the OOJllllon people taTored the democratio 
Borth against the aristooratio South and its institution of slaTe17. In 
France this feeling ..... not a. pronounced but that oount17 ... ould not aot 
without England.. 
fhi. policy _a exoellent on paper but ... hen. Seward issued the blookade 
proolaation, it collapaed legal17. In the proclaation Seward stated that. 
neutral ships, attempting to Tiohte the blockade. would be seized and con-
£ 18cated • The neutrala proteated strenuously'. It there _a no war. a. 
Seward bad stated, he bad no right to set up a blockade, and it he did, 
neutral shipping had a perfect right to ignore it. 
Under these circumstanoes, a DUmber ot these o&ses oame betore the 
Supreme Court. That body tound itself in a dittioult poaition. It it 
decided tl-.t there was no war, as Seward had stated, then. according to the 
rules ot interDaticmal la .... neutrals .... re tr.e to come and go, and the 
Union blockade would be rendered inetfectiTe. It. on the other band, it 
10 
'" upheld the blockade. it would be deciding that a state of war existed. and 
would be laying the Confederacy open to recognition by the European powers. 
Richard Dana. COUDsel for the govermaent. very effeotively presented 
the Court with a .!.!!! aooODlpli. He summed tne situation up thus. 
So the Judioiary i. actually. 
after a war 01' tweDty-three months dura-
tion. to deoide ... hether the Govermaent 
has the legal capacity to exert these 
war powers •••• COD.template ••• tbe possi-
bility of a Supreme Court. deoiding that 
this blockade is illega1\ What a posi-
tion it would put us in b.tore the world 
... ho.. oommeroe .... hay. been ill.gally 
prohibiting. whOlll ... e have unlawfully sub-
j.oted to a cotton tamine. and doaestic 
dangers and distress tor two yearst It 
would end the war. aDd how it would leave 
ua with neutral powers is fearful to con-
taplate.12 
The Court aooepted this reasoning but onl;y by a slia five to tour vote, 
Taney, Catron. Clifford. and Belson dissenting. The IBjority baaed their 
opinion on the taot that wars can and otten do exist even if' one power 
olaims sovereignty over another. or even in oases ... here a deolaration ot war 
is unilateral. 
That the deoision was a popular one with the countl7 there is no doubt. 
It was a case at "having your cake and eating it as .... 11... The Court _jor-
ity had seemingly upheld interuational la ... yet at the same time had vindi-
cated the blookade. 
Critici .. of the Court during these early years at the war seems to 
have been at a m1Btmwa. It is certainly a credit to the Court'. prudence 
---------.. -----
12 Warren, II, 380-5, see also Dean Altange. !!!. Supreme Court .!!!! ~ 
BatJ.onal.Will. Doubleday Doran and COll~, Garden City. ll.Y., 1937. 71. 
o -
11 
• 
and adaptabili't7 that this was the ca.e, but not, as i. often olaillled, an;y 
partioular oredit to its jUdioial ability. the Court was in faTor with the 
country because it was in .tep with the oountry. 1fben, later in the period, 
the Court refu.es to stretoh the Constitution any further, we find it in 
disrepute with large and influential seotions of the nation. The only in-
stanoe in this earq period tlat the Court refused to uphold the gOYermaent 
18 8ignifioant. In the wartime inoome tax law instituted by Congress, it 
rejected the provision wherein salaries of judges were to be taxed, on the 
13 grounds that it destroyed judioial independenoe. The Court might aooept 
and bOW' to oonditions on oocasion but it would never aooept the taot that it 
lIlUat bOW'. 
In one field, however, the Court stood adamant. lot onoe in the period 
trom 1861 to 1873 did that body de01de a oa.e involving 01vil rights in ~ 
but the striotest sense. The iaportanoe of' this o&m1ot be O'V'ere.t1-.ted. 
It has been a souroe ot 1II10h conjeoture as to what the state of oiv11 rights. 
would be today it the Court had giTen in at this time. While we are not 
prepared to study this problem here, we 111&1 say that the exposition ot 0Qr 
b~ of oivil rights to date stems in a great part from those preoedents 
set and those theories rejeoted during this era. 
It is 'brue that the Supre .. Court did not win all its battles involving 
oivil rights. On aome oocasions it waa ignominiousl:r orushed. It is 
equally true that in any instanoes the Court obviously avoided the islUes 
13 Warren, II, 387. 
12 
• 
at hand in order to maintain its existence as a parpoaef'ul body- What is 
important to remember, howe"t7er, is, that in spite 01' its deteats, its tail-
ures, and its omissiona, the Court did not add an iota to our body 01' law 
and precedent that would endanger future rights in more peaceful times _ In 
a somewhat limping analogy it could be compared to a aoldier crossing a 
stream and holding his ritle over his head. When he reaches the other side 
he may be somewlat bedraggled but he still possesles the wherewithal to ful-
till his jOb. In like manner, the Court was submerged during this time, 
but the law itself re-.ined untarnished. 
The tirst controversy over civil rights oame in the early days 01' the 
war in a case known as .!!. parte Jlerry:-.n. We have not included it in the 
previous discussion ot court decisions because, in actual tact, it involved 
not the whole Court, but only one man, Chiet Justioe Taney, and the reper-
cussionstollowing aftected the Court only indirectly. 
KerryDall was a Southern sympathiser residing in Maryland. His oonduot . 
and utteranoes had beoome notably odious to the military authorities who 
considered them a hindranoe to Northern suocess. He was, as a oonsequenoe, 
arrested and jailed in Fort JfcRenry. )ferryman promptly petitioned Taney, 
who was "on circuit" in Jlaryland, tor a writ 01' habeas corE!1'- Taney iasued 
the writ, directed to the commander ot the tort, but the latter refused to 
honor it, .ying he had been authorized by the President to suspend it. The 
Chiet Justice then countered by issuing a writ ot contempt against the CO.ll-
ander and .ent the United States Marshal to serve it. When the marshal 
reached the tort he was not permitted entrance. Taney then excused the 
13 
• 
_rshal but protested that he had a pertect right to torm a posse comitatus 
and storm. the fort. 
The Chiet Justice immediately sent a full acoount ot the incident to 
Lincoln, concluding that it r8Jlllined for the President It in fultillment ot 
the solemn oath of oltice, to enforce the law, exeoute the judgment of the 
Oourt, aDd release the prisoner ... 14 Lincoln nner sent an answer but Kerry-
an was later released and turned over to the civil authorities .16 .At .. 
later date, Lincoln -.de a general detense of all such cases when he stated: 
I concede that the class ot arrests 
complained ot oan be oonstitutio:nal only 
when in oases ot rebellion or invasion 
the publio aatety l18.y require themJ and 
I insist that in noh oa8es they are 
constitutional wherever the publio satety 
does require thBm, as well as in plaoes 
in which they _1' prevent the rebellion 
extending as in those where it -'1' al-
ready be prevailing.1S 
Taney observed to his son on the morning ot his opinion to the Presi-
dent that he would probably be in Fort :tleBenry himself by nightfall. It 
the newsl*P8rs ot the time lad their way he probab17 would have been. The 
majority of them showered him with criticism ot the very harshest nature. 
The !!! ~ _T ... ri_bun...;.,;,o.,_e bluntly stated, "When treason stalks abroad in arms, 
let deorepit judges give plaoe to men capable ot detecting and crushing it." 
------_ ..... _--.-
14 Robert Eugene Oushman, Leadint Oonstitutional Deoisions, F. S. Crotts 
and Oom.pa~, lew York, 1944, 1. 
15 Ibid. 
-
16 .Altange, 16. 
14 
As tar as the Tribune was concerned. said writ 1I8.S appropriate "in court. 
but not in oamps." and the oount17 lad more to tear trom judicial tyra.Jmy 
17 
than militar,y despotima. 
The Tribune's reaction was mild oompared to that of the New York Times 
- ---. 
which practical1,. aocused Taney ot out ... nd-out treason: "Too teeble to 
wield the sword against the Constitution. too old and palsied and weak to 
aroh in the ranks ot rebellion and tight against the· Union, he used the 
18 powers ot his ottioe to serve the oause ot the traitors." 
Condemnation ot Taney .s not univereal. however. Newspapers trQlll 
oities like Washington. Baltimore. and Cinohmati, where there were some 
Southern tendenoies. oOlllll8nded his action. admitting that although wartime 
exigencies sometimes overruled. legal aspeots. it 1I8.S right and proper that 
Taney take notice ot this situation in order to prevent encroachment in 
peaceful times. 
Taney's actions in the lIerJ71DllLn case have generally been upheld. 1.1- . 
though the right to suspend. the writ Qt habeas corp!s las never been decided, 
the right and duty of the judiciar,y to issue the writ and consider the legal 
question involved has been universally admitted. One biographer in particu-
lar has eulogized Taney tor hi. stand. stating. "There is nothing more sub-
lime in the aots ot great 1II1gistrates that give dignity to Governments than 
this attempt ot Chiet Justioe Taney to uphold the supr .... cy ot the Consti-
tution and civil authority in the midst of arms.w19 
--.. --~---.... ---.. 
17 New York Tribune. May 29, 1861. 
--
18 !!! ~ Times. May 29, 1861. 
19 William E. Kikell, Ro'i~ B. Tan (Great American La1llers, .!!.), 1906, 
188 oited in Warre -S 
15 
In spite of Taney's opposition, President Lincoln oontinued his POlicy, 
which culmiDatecl iB the Act of Maroh 3, 1863, otficially suspending the 
20 
writ of hab.-! oorpus in eases involving persons .aspeoted of disaffeotion. 
lIilitary arrest and military trials oontinued, along with strict oensorship. 
Taney was muoh saddened by these events, doubting that the Court would 
"ever be again restored to the authority and rank whioh the Constitution 
21 
intended to oonfer on it." 
There 8.ems to have been only scattered oppoeition to Linooln' s a.sump-
tion of extraordinary powers. Some legal luminaries like ex..Ju8tice Curtis, 
who published a pamphlet denounoing the President' 8 "usurpation of power," 
objeoted, but, generally, Linooln's aotions were upheld. The onl.y disous-
sion generated was on the theoretical point as to who had the power, Con-
gress or the President, to suspend hab.-s cor,pus. The right of suspension 
was tacitly admitted by m.o8t.22 
The o&se of .!.!. parte Vallandiea-, 24 Wallaoe 243, brought the issue 
before the whole Court in 1863. Clement Laird Vallandigham had been a 
Demooratic Kember of Congress who had been defeated for re-eleotion in 1862. 
He .... s· the leader of the "Butter:nut" or "Copperhead" element of the Demo-
cratic party, and had a notorious record of opposition to the Republicans 
---_ ... ---_.-.... -... -
20 WocdrowWilson, Division and Reunion, 1829-1889, 2nd ed., (Epochs of 
Am.eriean History), Longmans. Green, Hew York, 1929, 239. 
21 Warren, II, 375. 
22 It i8 interesting to note that future Chief Justice ClMl.se, while still 
Secretary of the Treasury in Linooln' 8 cabinet, claimed that the Presi-
dent had the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, bat advised 
him to let it be done by an .lot of Congress. !l!!. Diary 2! Gideon 'Welles, 
I, Septe.ber 15, 1863, cited in Warren, II, 375. 
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and the war gonrmaent. Be had violently opposed mil1 tary arrest and had 
gone as far as to deolare that Linooln, Seoretary of War Stanton, and. Gen-
eral Halleok, should be themselves arrested for their aotivities. In run-
ning for Governor of Ohio after his oongressional defeat, he was arrested 
by General Burnside tor making inoendiary speeohes against the govermaent. 
Vallandigham was tried by a military oourt, at whioh he refused to 
plead, stating that they bad no jurisdiction. He was, nevertheless, con-
victed on a oharge of "declaring disloyal sentiments," and was sentenced to 
oonfinement tor the duration of the war. Lincoln oommuted this to banish-
ment to the Confederacy with the stipulation that the sentenoe would be 
carried out should he return. 
The Demoorats protested vigorously. A great mass meeting was held b7 
the J;arty in Albany, and. resolutions 1r8re sent to the President demanding 
reversal of the deoidon, whioh Linooln refuaed to dO.23 
The deoision was appealed to the Supreme Court and the outoome was 
watohed with great expeotation as the whole tabrio of executive arrests and 
military trials _s involved. The Court, however, sidestepped the whole 
issue, ruling that it bad no jurisdiotion on petitions ot habeas oorpus 
issued to military oommi.sions. 
The Supreme Court _s obviously dereliot in its duty. From the legal 
standpoint, suoh a ruling, it allowed to stand, would be pure travesty and 
would make the judioiary a puppet of the military. This JIIlst have been 
apparent to the Court, tor three years later in the celebrated Milligan Case 
---.... ---.. ---_ .. 
23 Benr,y William Elson, Bi8t0k: ot the United States of America, 5th ed., 
Macmillan COJIlp&ny', lIew for, 1927,695-1. -
~------------. 
24: 1t took jurisdiotion on almost the identioal iasues. 
At the ti1l.8 of the Vallandigha.m deoision, however, the Court .. a 
11 
unwilling to be pat "on the spot." It realised that a decision favorable 
to the plaintitt would plaY' havoc with all previoue and all tuture executive 
aotions, and, turtheBore, 1rOtlld probabl;y Dot be respected b;y the war govern-
lIl8nt. In a situation suoh a8 that, the Court would not only be in disfavor 
with the _jorit;y of the people, bQt allo its prestige as an independent 
and respeoted tribunal would be seriously curtailed. On the other ha.nd, a 
decision favorable to the government would introduoe a vel"1' dan~rous prece-
dent to our body ot law, a thing the Court oertainly- did not wish to do. 
For the Court then, there was the only course left open, that ot refus-
ing to hear the O&se. It would bring censure from a number of souroes and 
a temporary deoline in publio oonfidenoe, but no penanent stigaa. This 
teohnique was to be used a number of time. in the dark day-s of Reoonstruo-
tion. Its soundness as a Court policy- a.ems to have been proven, up to a 
point. Certainly the Court has regained, in the oourse of ita later history, 
&n1' prestige that was lost durblg this period. Whether outspoken and forth .. 
right action on the part ot the Court at this time would have ohanged the 
history ot the era, or shortened the troublous times, is debatable. It i. 
oertainl;y possible that the Court might have lost "el")" vestige ot inde-
pendence. 
Chief Justice Taney died in October, 1864:. Even in death the Dred 
Scott deoision followed him. While some admitted him a just man of 
-_ .. _-----.--_ ..... ,., 
24: Carl Brent Swisher, Stephan J. Field, Craftsman of the Law, The Brook-
inga Institution, Wasllii ton"; 1930, l~§. - --
~-. ----------------------------~ 
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unblemished private life, his epitaphs still pilloried htmfor his judicial 
reoord. It was unfortunate that he died in such violent times. Aa it wall, 
his most famous decision was considered by "J2Y as the souroe of all the 
present woes. 
There was the usual sparring for the vaoant Chief'-Justioeship but 
Salmon Chase .... s generally expected to get it. Long before Taney' 8 death, 
Linooln had stated, "There is not one man in the Union who would ake as 
good a Chief Justice as Chase, and, if I baTe the opportunity, I will _ke 
htm Chief' Justioe of the United States."25 In addition to presidential 
approval for the poat, he ..... 'backed by four of the most influential men in 
the oountry, Secretary Stanton and Senators Sumner, Wilson, and Fessenden. 
That Chase was an able an had never been questioned. Even his laok of' 
qualifioations tor such a post were expeoted to be overcome by his natural 
ability. His ohiet fault was consuming ambition, particularly for the pres-
idency, which, as Linooln put it, amounted to a form of insanity •. Linooln -
had ade him. a cabinet member because of his reoognised ability but was con-
stantly plagued by his Seoretary's "under-outting." In 1864 a letter was 
brought to Linooln's attention, written by Chase to Senator Pomoroy, in 
which the former stated that Lincoln was neither the pa.rtyt S nor the people' 8 
ohoice in the coming election, and, by inferenoe, that he would be willing 
26 
to aooept the nominationJ this while a member ot the President' 8 cabinet. 
Lincoln ignored this as he did other imperfections, and although Chase 
--------_ ... -----
25 warren, II, 400. 
26 Edward Channing, A History of the United States, llacmillan Company, New 
York, 1925, VI, 5'§'O-i. - -
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tendered his tesignation regularly, the President never aooepted it. Though 
Chase managed to pertorm adequate~ as Chiet Justioe, he never tully recov-
ered trom the "presidential bug." Shortly atter the close ot the war, and 
as Chiet Justioe ot the Supreme Court, he made a historio junket through the 
South, making politioal capital with statements suoh as, "It all the people 
feel as I do, you will not have to ~it long tor equal rights at the ballot 
box; no longer than it would take to pass the neoessary law. ,,27 Aside trom 
the political sentiments involved, whioh, presumably, would not be too popu-
lar in the newly viotorious North, the taot that they were politioal in 
oharacter was enough to bring inveotive down on Chase. The!!!! ~ World 
tailed to peroeive 
••• how it either comports with the 
dignity, or is consistent with the propri-
eties ot that great position to be pe~­
bulating a disquieted portion of the coun-
try making harangues on a disturbing 
question whioh the authorities have not 
yet decided.28 
Comments like these apparently did not subdue Chase. As late as 1872, 
he was still angling for the Republican nomination tor President. Although 
his activities in this line never influenced his decisions as a justice--
rather, his deoisions as a justice otten militated against his chances for 
the Presidency--they did contribute to the impairment of p~lar oonfidence 
in him and in the Court. 
-----........ ---.... 
27 Claude Bowers, The Tragic Era; The Revolution After Linooln, Halcyon 
House, New York71'929, 55..:r:- -
28 Ibid., 66. 
-
,.,... 
-~-------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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• With the appomtment of Chase, the membership of the Court that was to 
grapple with the jUdioial problems of Reoonstruotion was oomplete. It 1I8.S 
still relatively untested, eDotly one-half ot the Court being Lincoln 
appointll8nta. It had compiled no judicial record ot note during the war, 
and was now to enter on an even more diffioult period. In its favor -.s one 
thing. It had tread oautiously and prudently through the political mora88 
generated by the late confliot. In entering the CODling struggle for power, 
it was still an unknown quantity. 
,,-
-~------------------------------------------------------~ 
ClfAPTER II 
RECOJlSTRUCfICIl 
With the end of the Civil War, the powerful Reconstruction Congress 
took over the reins of national control. Their attitude and program soon 
became quite clear to all interested parties. The South was to be _de to 
PlY heavily tor the rebellion, and Reoonstruotion was to be acoomplished by' 
treating that area as oonquered provinoes with little or no voioe in their 
eventual restoration to the Union. lIoreover, the lI8U1S that Congress 
intended to use became equally olear. The legislative branch _de it quite 
apparent from the vel'7 begbming that it would brook no interferenoe tra 
any quarter, and, it such were attempted, would use every legal and extra-
legal means at it. command to prevent it. 
Suoh an incisive detinition ot polioy quickly divided the victorious 
North into two political camps. President Johnson had, with equal fervor, 
annoan.oed hi. intention of carrying out the "mild" policy laid down by hi. 
predeoessor. Around him gathered the moderate Republicans and the r_1II.s 
ot the Demoorats. On the other side were the Radical Republicans, the con-
trolling group, supported by the bulk ot the press and the people. 
The tierce struggle between President JohnsOll and Congress i. well-
mown, and it is not within the soope. nor is it the purpose of this paper. 
to delineate it tully. exoept where it oonverges on the Supreme Court. 
21 
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We mention it partioularly, however, as it is ot priae importance to keep 
oonstantly' in mind, during this period, the s}arp and intense oleavage that 
existed between the exeoutive and the legislative branohes. 
While the Court had done nothiJlg during the .... r to antagonize Congress, 
it, nevertl1eles8, entered the Reoonstruotion period under a veil ot legis. 
lative suspioion rather tlan an aura ot legislative approbation. For one 
thing, it oonsisted at tive D_oorat., tour ot whOll were pre ...... r appomtees, 
and two ot those Southerners. While Linooln's appointments were relativel,-
unenownbered by' their previous judioial reoords, the;y IIlight oonoeivabl,- be 
expected to support the Linooln program of Reconstruotion, now being oham-
ploned by Johnson. 
Because ot the Court t s iDnoouous war reoord, there were no open threats 
made by' Congress, suoh as were made to the President. At the HlIle time, 
there were no eulogies proolaimed; rather, it _s an attitude ot doubt 
tinged nth oasual contempt, ... 11 expressed by Stanton when he suggested 
that Linooln's aooused assassins be sent to 801leplaoe like the D17 Tortuga.s 
"where old B.lson or ~ other Judge would not tr,y to make d1ttioult,y by' 
habeas corpus ... l 
The death at Justioe Catron in Kay, 1866 _de the Court an umr1lling 
party to the battle between Johnson and Congress. The President had nomin-
ated hla friend and adviser, Attorney-General Benr,y Stanbery to the vacaDt 
post. Congress was not prepared to put a JohnsOll man on the Court, at this 
--_ .. ---... -........ --
1 Warren, II, 421. 
• 
or a~ other time, and solved the problem by passing a bill introduced by 
senator Trumbull. cutting the number ot Assooiate Justices to seven. While 
the status ot the sitting Oourt 1I'O\11d not be atfected, it would, in all pro-
bability, prevent Johnson from making any appointments during his term ot 
office. The death ot Justice Wayne in 1867 was, likewise, not followed by 
2 
an appointment. 
The .American Law Review, a.t this time, c1a1aed there was DC serious 
....... ---------
opposition to the reduotion exoept for the hardship it worked on the remain. 
ing justices as far as distribution of duties. It i"urther olaimed, in all 
simplioiV, that the passage ot the law was Dot a result of politioa, but a 
genuine attempt to improve the flexibility ot the Court.3 Whether this 
vi ... was cOJllllonl,.. held at the time ot enactment of the la. is questionable. 
Oertainl,.. later events proved the political aspects ot it, when four years 
after, in Grant' 8 administration, the lILembership of the Oourt was increased. 
The Supr8Jlle C01.lrt entered the Reconstruotion picture more aotively in 
the attempts to bring Jefterson Davis to trial. A. in the Jlerryan Oa.e 
earlier, it was thr01.lgh its Chief Justioe that the Oourt aoted. Jolmson and 
his oabinet had deoided on a oivil rather than lIlilitary trial tor Davis, 
teel1ng it would be easier to obtain a oonviction on oharges ot high treason 
than tor com.plicity in Linooln's assassiDation, the latter trial being heard 
by a military tribtmal. An indiotment returned in the Distriot of Oolumbia 
--~ .... --....... -----
2 Ibid., 423. 
-
3 .bIerioan La. Review, (Hew York), 1867, I, 206. ~.;.;...;;.;,;;.;;- - ;;.-...-;.;.,;,;. 
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_s quashed as the act of treason had not been committed there. Virginia 
4 
bad to be the locale, but that state was under the control ot the military. 
In view ot the complicated situation, President Jolmson asked Cmse to 
confer with him in August 1865 on ways and means ot conductiDg the trial. 
ExtraordiDaril;r, Chase declined to meet with the President. Gideon Welles, 
one ot Johnson's most l~l associates, accused Chase ot wishing to dodge 
any responaibilit;r in case ot aoquittal b,y this action, describing him as 
" ••• cowardly and aspiring, shirking and presumptuous, torward and .... sive ••• 
an ambitious politioian; possessed ot mental resources, yet atraid to use 
5 them, irresolute as well as ambitious." Chase himself stated he bad 
declined until "all possibility of claim that the judicial is subordinate 
- 6 
to the military power is removed, by express deolaration of the President." 
To appearanoes, Chase .... s passing the ball right baok to Johnson. On 
Octcber 2nd ot the 8&1Ile year, however, Johnson addressed a formal note to 
the Chiet Justice, stating that "It may beoome necessary that the govern-
ment proseoute some ot the crimes and misdemeanors oommitted against the 
7 United States within the distriot ot Virginia." He asked whether the oir-
ouit courts were so tar organized that Chase or an assooiate oould hold 
oourt there during autumn or early winter. 
" George Fort Milton, The ~ ot Bate; Andrew Jolmson and the Radioals, 
Coward MoCann, N .... York,---r9"ao. "!'i'r-6. - -
6 Welles, Dia!l' II, 366, oited in Kilton, 766. 
6 Warren, II, 421. 
7 Milton, 246. 
~--------------------------------------, 
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• After a delay ot ten days, Chase replied in the negative, doubting the 
propriet.y of holding oourt in a state whioh had been deolared in a state ot 
rebellion, and therefore subjeot to -.rt1&l la.... lie reiterated his previous 
S Tie ... that the ailitary mst be superseded by the oivil authorities. 
A letter written by George Brown, one of Davis' oounsel, to Franklin 
Pieroe, somewhat deflates Chase's line of reasoning. Brown oomments bitterly 
that the Chief Justioe refuses to sit in Virginia beoause it ia under -.rtial 
law. Be points out, however, that Chase is perfectly willing to hold oir-
ouit, and, in faot, is holding oircuit in Maryland, although that state is 
also under Dartial law. His oonolusion is that Chase t 8 reluotanoe re8ults 
from. not wishing to reoognize Virginia as legally in the Union.9 
lI'bat Chase's motives were is difficult to fathOJll. The point taken by 
Brown. is a tenable one. If, as Chase stated, he refused to hold oourt where 
mrtial law existed, his argument on that basis is nullified by his actions 
in the loyal but militarily ruled state of Jlaryland. Theoretioall;y, the 
federal oourts sitting in that state were as muoh subservient to the mili-
tary, by Chase's own definition, as they would be in Virginia. 
A modified form ot Welles' oOJlll18nts is probably olosest to the faots. 
It appears most likely that Chase did not wish to beoome embroiled with the 
dereated states in any way until the situation was olarified. 
In the spring of' the following year the subjeot of the trial again oaDl8 
up, but thinking on it had ohAnged. It was felt by :many that the trial would 
8 Ibid. 
-
9 Warren, II, 421. 
~~. -----------------------. 
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unneoessari1y endanger the valiliity 01' the Reoonstruotion program which hali 
been initiated. Davis ...... the ohiet symbol 01' the Centederacy to Northern 
eyes, and, as Attorney Henry Nicoll put it in a letter to Jolmson, "It Davis 
should be acquitted, he would be purged ot all orime, and all the Rebela 
10 
would be adjudged innooent." 
It was deoided to indiot Davia tor a more minor orime, and in )la7 ot 
1866 an indictment was returned that Davis 
••• owing al1egianoe and tidelit" to the 
United States 01' Amerioa ••• on the 15th da7 
ot June, in the year 01' our Lord, 1864, in 
the oity of Rio_ond ••• with a great alti-
tude ••• most wiokedly, -.lioiously, and 
traitorously did ordain, prepare, levy and 
carry- on war against the United States.ll 
When Davia' counsel went to Chase to tind out 1£ he would admit the 
tormer to bail, they tound that the Chiet Justioe was still unwilling to 
hold oourt. Although the peaoe proolamation bad been issued b;y Jolmson--
whioh the Court had reoognized as binding-Chase olaimed that subsequent 
actions on the J:1lrt ot the President and the Seoretary- ot War were inoon-
sistent with the interpretation that the writ ot habeas oorf!1s bad been 
tully restored.12 
Chase has oooasional17 been aoolaimed tor hi, steadfast refutal to 
admit Da"ds to trial while the locale ot the trial was still under military 
domination, in spite ot the threats 01' the Radical Congress. This aoolaiJll 
.... _------------
10 Milton, 324. 
11 Ibid. 
-
12 Ibid. DaTi. 1I8.S eventually released in February, 1869 1arge17 through 
the ettort. 01' lforaoe Greele7. 
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is not completely justified. It Est be re1l8mbered that it .... the Pre.i-
dent more so than Congres. who presaed for the trial, .0 that Oha8e .... 
pitting him.self' a. DlQch against a weak Jomson as against a strong Congre8s. 
There were, in fact, a tew radicals in Oongress who did not favor the trial. 
13 SeDator Sumner open17 stated he was sorry that Davi. _s oaptured alive. 
Whatever Ohase t • justification, he gained no tavor with either taction. The 
issue was taken out of his hands in July, 1866 when Oongress removed circuit 
jurisdiction in the reoonstructed states trom the Oourt's hands, although 
14 
eventual17 restoring it when those areas beoa1l8 more settled. 
In 1866, the Supreae Oourt _de its tirst prominent entranoe into the 
Reconstruction pioture in deciding the Milligan Oase.15 From then on, 1t 
was to be oontinual1y involved in aDd atfected by the Congressioaa1 prog~. 
The Milligan Oase stands out like a beaoon in the histo~ ot the Oourt at 
this tt., and oertainly ... s the pinnacle ot judicial independence in an 
era that saw very l1tt1e ot it. With the possible exoeption ot the Test 
Oath Oases, which we shall take up later, it was the only positive, judicial-
ly sound, and politically uninfluenced action that the Oourt took and stood 
by in the whole deoade. 
As has been aentioned earlier, the case involved fundamentally the 
same issues evident in the Vallandigham Oase three years previous. However, 
the details in the present case were suoh that the Oourt oould not easily 
-----.. -._---.... 
13 Ibid., 246. 
-
14 Warren, II, 421. 
15 .!! J!:rte ~illigan, 4 Wallaoe 2. 
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ignore it. Jlilligan, a resident of' Indiana, had been arrested late in the 
_r by General Hovey, oOlllDl1Jlding the Military Distriot of' Indiana. He had 
been tried bT a military court and f'ound guilty ot inciting insurreotion, 
and of' treasonable and disloyal" practices. He was sentenoed to be hanged on 
May 19, 1865, President Johnson baving ref'used to alter the court's deois-
16 ion. 
Nine days prior to the execution of' the sentence, Jlilligan sued out a 
writ of habeas oorpus to the United States Cirouit Court in Indiana. The 
Supre.., Coart was toroed to take jurisdiotion because, unlike Vallandigham, 
Milli~n had applied for reliet through a civil oourt rather than a military 
commission, the latter being tho Supreme Court' 8 stated reason tor deDying 
1'1 
itself juriadiotion in the earlier case. Thas, tor the first time the 
Court was to rule on the auspension of' _beas corpus. 
Formidable coun.el represented lIilliga.nJ David Dudley Field, JUleS Gar-
f'ield, and. Jeremiah Blaok. The government was represented by Attorney. 
General Stanbery and Senator Ben Butler. The ca.e was argued on two pointsJ 
whether the President oould set up a judicial body in opposition to the oivil 
oourts, a8 wa8the ca8e with the exeoutive appointed military oommissions, 
and whether, if' justif'ied in time of' war, suoh authority would extend to a 
state not in the actual theatre of' war. lS 
16 Cushman, 61-2. 
1'1 warren, II, 425. 
18 Cuahan, 61-.3. 
~~----------------------------------~ -
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On April 3, 1866, three 'neb af'ter the arguaents .. re heard. the COIl" 
aDl1OUl1oed, without o .. ent, ita UDaJ11aous decision in f'avor of' the plaintitf'. 
It oreated little stir, be1J1g on17 0& sua 1 17 reported 1J1 the press. Presua-
ab17, both Johnson and .the iadioal. realized ita importanoe but there 'nre 
no publio utteranoes until the opinions were given out. It is 801letimes 
oonsidered aign1tioant that the Court membership _s reduoed shoriq after 
the deoision. It i, doubtful, however, if' the deoision lad ~ eff'eot on 
the passage of the aot. Oongressiona1 reasons tor the reduction already' 
existed, aDd outting the ... berahip would hard~ of'f'set ~ like deoisions 
in the future. 
The opinion of the Court was d.1i ..... r.d on Deoeaber 17, 1866. Ooaplet. 
UD&J11mi1i7 waa d.o1ared in rej.oting the right of the Pr.sident to set up 
military oOlllia81ons. Five of the justioes went further, holding that the 
Constitution oould not be suspeDded und.r any oonditions. B.cause of this, 
the re.iniDg four justioes, Chase, 1I1l1er, Swayn., and Wayne, f'iled a dls- . 
,enting opinion 0J1 that portion of it. They f.lt that this stateaent was an 
unn.o.ssar,y interjeotion not arising out of' the f'aots of' the caae. aDd th87 
ref'used to r.gard the power of' Congress, if' not the power of the Pre.ident, 
subjeot to suoh limitations.19 
Justice David Davia, speaking alao for Fi.ld, Gri.r. Cliff'ord, and 
.elson, d.livered a -.sterfu1 opinion. He said in part, 
-.. .... ------_ ...... --
The COJ18'bitutiOJ1 of' the United States 
i. a law f'or rul.rs and people, equally in 
war and in peaoe, and oovers with the 
shield of' its proteotion all olasses of 
aen, at all tilles. 8.D.d under all oirou:a-
.tanoe.. 10 dootr1ne inTo1".i:ng aore 
pernioious oODsequenoe ...... ever invented 
b7 the wit ot an than that 8.D¥ ot it. 
prov1dous oan be suspended during &J17 
of the great exigenoie. ot government. 
Suoh a dootrine leads direotly to 
&Darolv' or de.potism.. but the theory 
ot neoesslt,y on whioh it ia baaed la 
ta1se, tor the gO'Yermaent, within the 
Oo:nst1tut1OD, baa all the powers 
granted to it whioh are neoesSLr,f to 
pre.erve its exis:t.noe, as "has been 
happ11)," proved b7 the result ot the 
great ettort to throw ott lts authority •••• 
Martial law can never exi8t where the 
courta are open, and with the proper and 
unobstruoted exeroise ot their jurla-
diotlon..20 
1'he Radlca1a were bitter1)'" againat the ru1i1'lg ot the Oourt. Their 
leader, Thaddeua Stevena, oonddered it 
••• though iJ1 tenu not so lDtaaou8 
perhaps as the Dr8d Soott deoision, (It) 
1. )'"et tar aore clangerou8 in 1ta opera-
tion upon. the 11".e. and 1ibertie. of 
107&1 lI8n •••• 1'lat deoi.ion. ha. unaheathed 
the dagger ot the a.aaaain and plaoe. the 
kDite ot the rebel at the breaat ot every 
aD. who doea proo1aia himself ••• a UDiOJ1 
an.21 
30 
Orie. ot judioia1 ~ and re.toratiO!1 ot aouthern dG.lliDation .. re raised 
promptly. The R&dioa1 organ, !!! IJlciependent called it the most claJ1geroua 
op1ll1on ever prOJlOUlloed 'b7 the Oourt;. Job:n FOl"J1e7' a .ahington Ohronio1e 
----.---.---_-.. 
20 OuallaBJ1, 63-4. 
21 Bowers. 153. 
~~--------~--~ 
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• 
_8 the mo.t soathing 1n it. oritioia, atatiDg that "The heart. of traitor. 
will be glad by the armOWloeaent that treason, 'ftDqu1ahed upon the battle-
field and hunted trOJll "err other retreat, haa at last tound a seoure shelter 
in the bo.OJR ot the Supr ... Court.,,22 Forney proceeded to pablilh a .erie. 
of editorials, oontinuing through Deoember and Januarr, vilitying the judge. 
23 in the worst posaible -'1_ 
Generally, the opponent. ot the deoiaion 'ba.ed their opinions on the 
idea that the satev of the union i. aore 11lportant in oritical times that 
rigid adherenoe to the law. The aoousation was al.o _de that the Court 
_. more partioularq alding Johnson than it .. a enforoing the law by the 
deoision. 
All the OOJlllMDt .... Dot 1Ulf'avorable, hOW8Ter. The lational Inte1li-
genoe,r defended the Court, stating: 
It is not the oriru of treason 1I'h10h 
1. shielded by this .emorab1e deoision, 
bat the saored rigbt;s of the oitizen tlat 
is Tindioated against the arbitrarr de-
oisions ot ailitarr authoriV. Aboye the 
sight of the nord, the _je~ ot the 
law is thaa rai.ed supr .... " 
And, on cother oocaaion, that paper lashed out against the oritios ot the 
Court: 
-_ .... _----------
22 )lilton, 402. 
They are disloyal, who, under the 
pretense of preserving the libertie. ot 
tM oitil8Jl, have disregarded the 
23 warren, II, 433_ 
24 Milton, 402. 
obligations ot the organio law. !he7 are 
dilUDioni8ts. who. olaiJling to tight tor 
the Union. have trampled upon ita funda-
mental bond.25 
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The Springtield RepubU~ took the :Iloderate Republioan n.... Revi ... -
ing the oritioia ot the deoision. that paper oonsidered it - atrangeq sia-
understood and perTerted.- It oould .ee no great danger to the Reoonatruo-
tion prograa. as. although the President lad proolaimed peaoe. and oinl 
law 'ft.. theoretioally restored. oondi tiona sight nll 'ft.rrant otherwise and 
the oall would oontinue tor ail itar,y , oourts.26 
History la_ generall,. upheld the view or the soderate press. The 
decision .... s oertainl,. just and proper although aD7 historians are. ino1lJled 
to side with the ainority on the portion ot the deoision oonoerning Congre ••• 
lonal power. The Court has been oritioized tor expre •• ing an opinion on 
this taoet ot the •• e when nODe 'ft.. oa11ed tor. It _. the opiniOJl ot the 
... Aa_8_r_i_oan_ ~ Review that the potenoy ot the deciaiOJlllaS partially 1lU111tied 
by thi. addenda. 
---.. -~----------
Iutead ot approaohing the subject ot 
the powers ot the cGOrdiDate branohes ot 
the goyermaent as one ot great de110&07. 
whioh thw,r were loath to oonsider but whioh 
th.,- te1t bound to pass upon because it 
..... involved in the righteoull deoision of 
the ca.e betore them ••• the,y have seemed 
eager to go b.,-oncl the reoord. and not 
onl7 to .tate the reason ot their pre.ent 
judgaent, but to 1a7 down the principle. 
on whioh they would deoide' other question., 
25 Warren. II, 435. 
26 Springtield ( •••• ) Republican, Januar,. 2, 1867. 
not nOW' betore theJa, molTing the graTeR 
and highest powers of Cong1'"Oss.2'1 
The OO\1Jltl7 qulckl,. realised that the deoision oould easily upset the 
whole ieoonstruotion program. It, as the Court stated, aili ta1'7 trib1mals 
lad no authoriv exoept in aotual theatre ot war where oinl courts 1I'8re not 
tunotioning, it was reasonable to a88U11le that wbat bad applied to IDdi&!Ul 
in 1864 ooold also be applied to the Southern .tate. in 1866. 
Thi. was apparent to the Congress1ODAl leaders, and they were deoi4ed17 
angr,y and oonoerned OYer the possibilities presented. 1866 had been a 
balmer 7ear tor the Radicala in Congre.s. The7 had oOJllpleteq aDd auooe •• -
tull,. reptldiated Jobaaon'. plan ot reoonstruotion. and bad oapped tbat with 
28 
a reaounding v1oto17 over tke President in the )JoYeaber eleotions. rbi. 
the,. oonsidered a andate trOJll the OOW'ltry to go ahead with their om plana. 
Now theY' were taoed with a Supreae Court. it not open17 hostile. at lean 
UJl81llpatlaetio tonrd congressional aotiTitie •• 
Congress oonteaptuousl,. disregarded the deoisiam in the Milli~ case. 
howeTer. and ocmtinued with ita plans in .pite ot their doubtful legaliV. 
In Febru&l7 186'1. two .cmtu atter full 8.DDOtmo_nt ot the Court' a deolaiem. 
Thaddeus St .... 1ntro4uoed his "Great ieoonstruotion Aot." The Supreae 
Court was openly warned against &lIT obstruotionist tendenoie •• eTen to talk 
ot t.peaohing the jU8t10e. should the.1 stand in the wa7_ 
The Radicals had good reasCD to tear the 1ti.ll1gan deoision. J ohnaon 
aDd hi. a.sociates were jubilant, aDd the Pre.ident t.B.ed1at.ly isaued ord.rl 
.,._--_ ..... ---_ .. 
2'1 Aaerioan ~ .... R_.vi...-,.;.81I'..... April 186'1. I. 5'12. 
28 Ellan, 759-64. 
~.~. --------------------------~ 
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dismissing all trials ot oivilians by the Jdlitary in those states where 
oongress had olaised a oondition ot war still existed. Even .ore Ullsettling 
to Congre.s was the etteot it would bave on the trial ot Linooln's 
-assassins.- Within a week ot the deoiaion, one ot the OODYioted men, 
Dr. Sa.el Jludd, applied to Chase tor a writ ot habeas oorpus. The latter 
denied the application but onq because it 1I8.S out ot his oircuit. The 
effect of this reasoning, then, would be to make those exeouted as a result 
of the trial, viot1Ju of a legalised lJl1ching. This would redound on Con-
gresa, a.s the leaders or that body bad pushed the trial. 
There _s heated debate in Congres8 over the possibilities resulting 
trca Mudd' 8 writ. ... resolution 1I8.S offered that the JUdioiaJ'7 CClllDllittee 
report the advisability of repealing the Habeas Corpus .Act of 1863 Wto preTen 
the Supreme Court from releasing and disobarging the assassins ot lIr. 
Lincoh._29 
, •. all these ramifications of the Milligan decisiO,n be~ to dawn on 
the countJ7, agitation grew tor reorganization of the Court. There 1I8.S a 
oall tor increasing the ae:m.berahip ot the Court but this 118.8 rejected as 
President J ohllson would still 1IBke the appointments. During the Deoember and 
January following the deoision, Congress debated steps to curb the Court. 
Rep. Bingham. of Ohio urged i1nmedia.te removal of the Court' 8 appellate 
jurisdiotion, aDd, it neoessary, abolition of the Court by oonstitutional 
amendment. Wil11 .... of Pennayl'ft.Dia presented a bill d8JlBJldiJlg ooncurrence 
---.... ----_ ........ -
29 Warren, II, 442-4. 
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ot 1.11 justioes in a.ny opinion involving I. oonstitutional question. !hese 
SUggestions never jelled. but it is I. aa.lient example ot the palSiODS ot the 
t~e that suoh auggestiODs. 80 repugnant today, oould be seriously ottered 
and aeriwaly eonsietered. 
It -.a during these debates that the Court -.naged to enrage the iadieals 
further by its deoision in the Test Oath Case. of January 1867. SO These 
oases bad grown. out of the att8llpte by the DatiODal and state government. to 
demand an oath ot lo.yal~ trQm tho.e suspected ot aiding the rebellion before 
allowing them to eDgage in a DUmber of protessions. In It1s8our1, tor eample, 
eless the oath had been taken, a person oould not vote, hold otfiee in a 
public or prin.te corporation, t_oh, practice law, or officiate at religious 
service.. h this ~, all 1Dtluential and luoratiye positions .... re denied 
the ex-rebela unless they took the oath, aDd that ooyered suoh a Dmltitude of 
sina that there .... re probably many lfortherners who oould not have oOll_oien-
tiOR-l1 takeD it. 
The Congresaional Test Oath followed the same general prinoiple in that 
it exoluded 1&1J78r8 trom. practioing in Federal court_ unless they hact first 
taken an Gath that th.,. had in no _1' aided the rebellion. In the KissourS. 
ca8e, a minister named Cummings brought the appeal, and in the Federal oase, 
AleDDder Garland, a noted Confederate leader •• _ the petitioner.Sl 
-------~~--~~--' 
30 Culllldng8 VI. llia8ouri, .!! ~o Garland, 4 Wallace 277,SSS. 
Sl Saatel Elin Morison and Henry Stoele CCBIIIIlger. The Growth of the 
.er1oan iepublio. Srd eel •• Oxford University Priss. I .. Y~,""42. II, 51. 
~~.---------------------------. 
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The cases had been argued early in 1866 and, in the interim between the 
argument and the d.eoision, were a souroe of JIIl10h 1008e oonversation. For one 
tbiDg, Justice Fi.ld.' s brother was oOQnsel tor Cuaudngs, and Field himself 
had pres8ed the Court for early dispol!lition of t~t case. This started. 
l'\1IIlors that the la ... was certain to be held unconstitutional. When the 
decision in the Milligan case 1I8.S announced, this talk grew, a8 Field ad 
deoided in that ca8e for his brother's oUent. 
Posa1bly as a reeult of this, developments in Missouri started a tlurlT 
of iDvective and turious correspondence. Aocording to a letter to Ohief 
Justice Chase tram a friend-in Missouri, two Democratic politioians named 
Blair aDd Hogan had spread the sto1")" throughout the state that the cases were 
already decided and the Test Oaths would be ruled unconstitutional. III 
attempting to ake political capital, they further stated that one. of the 
judges bad SO iDf'ormed thea. Shortl,. after this became known, Cha.e reoeived 
a letter from Justioe Miller stern1,. denying &D1' such thing and stating that. 
same justices had not even expre8sed opinions as yet on the cases 1DvolTed. 
Field followed with a stinging rebuke to the Democrats, and partioular17 
Senator Reverd,. Johnson, whoa, he to14 Case, he cOIlsidered responsible for 
the whole tale.S2 
It 1s oertainl,. doubtful whether there 118.8 any advanoe information given 
out. It was definitely not the practice of the Court to ooae to a deoision 
a.:m.ong 1ts own MJIlbera and then hold it otf tor siz BlOnths to a year. It 
opinions ... re not published at once, it 118.8 at lea8t the practice to land 
-----_ .. _-------
32 Chase Papers, Manuscript Divisi~ of the Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.J oited in Swisher, 142 .... 147. 
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down the d.eiaion promptly. More probably, it was purely a political aneuve 
on the part of the minority to gain enough adher.nts to upset the R.publican 
party in Missouri. At any rate, it contributed greatly to the ill feeling 
generated when the decision .. s eventually announced. 
The Court split five to four on the deeision, with the pr ...... r justices, 
Grier, Belson, Wayne, and Clitford supporting Field in the m.jority opinion. 
In reading his opinion, Field stated tlat the oaths reflected not only 
against overt .nmity, but against thought., words, sympathies, and desires. 
They retlected not only against inimical acta but those based on oharity, 
aftection, and relationship. As far as he could see there was no precedent 
for the oaths. These various acts did not indicate unfitness for a particu-
lar calling; rather, because 01' these act., and as a punishment for them, the 
people involved were to be prevented trom tollowing that calling. To Field, 
this was punishment of a past act not punishable at the time, such as leaving 
the state to avoid the draft. Other aots ot enmity covered in the oath, if 
orimes at the time of commission, had already been punished in other 1I8.ys. 
In supporting this thesis, Field cited the ex post facto and bill of 
----
attainder clauses in the Constitution. 
The justice brought in another telling point in the exposition of the 
o&se. Because oertain of the people were foroed to take these oaths, and 
oould not assume their full rights as citizens until they did, they were, for 
all praotioal purposes, oonsidered guilty until proved innooent; i. e., b.v 
taking the Test Oath. Th1a, Field pointed out, was in opposition to the 
f\mdamental prinoiples of common law, as well as the spirit of our own 
llartiOUlar law. 
I 
I' 
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The four ..minority justioes disagreed with Field's reasoning holding that 
the legislation was desirable a8 a proteotion again8t disloyalty. they 
further pointed out, oiting the Garland case 1*rtioularly, that the opportun-
ity to practioe law -.. not an. ab80lute right but a privilege granted by la ... , 
and a8 suoh, it was the duty of Congres8 to presoribe its qualifications, of 
which loyaltr was one.3S 
Caaing on top of the deoision in the Milligan o&se, it showed the 
Supreme Court a8 sublimely unaffected by the tUIIIUlt. Less than. a month 
apart the Court bad gi'Yen opinions on two 0&8es. In one it nullified an 
existing law, and in. the other it threatened to do the same to the ... hole 
Congressional progr&m. 
Congress wa8 prodded to aotion by these deciaions and a nUJliber of 
lerious attemptl ... ere _de to curtail the power of the Court. A8 a result of 
the Test Oath Cases, George Boutwell introduced a bill in Congress ... hioh 
would provide a rule in. all courts that no ex-rebel oould aot as an attorney 
until the rebellion was suppressed, and, of oourse, it was the Radical con-
tention that, as yet, it had not been.S4 It was not warmly supported, how-
ner, a8 any considered it an. "attempt to neutralize the deoision of the 
Court.... Congres8 is not the tinal judge of the ftlidity of it8 own acta, 
\I 
aDd oannot make it8elt so, ... hile there is a Constitution and a Supreme Court. 
-------.. --.. --~--
~3 Swisher, 146-50. 
M Warren, II, 453 
a5 !Pringtield Repablloan, January 26, 1867. 
~--------------------------~ 
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• )(ore .tringent legislation was attempted later in 1868, which. 11' 
paned, would have _de a mockery of the Court. It would ban required six 
judges to deolare an Act of Congress uconstitrcttiODal but only the usual tive 
in other O&ses. It .... s turther propo.ed that Congres8 should have the right 
of recall oyer any Court decision. 1'hia, of course, would ha.Te been a death 
blow to judicial independence, as a strong Congre.. suoh as the 1'hirty-
Eighth oould run raJIlpant, with the knowledge that it oould easil,.. oyerrule 
any Court aotion. 
The Court ._ saved trom this d1.-.1 future ohiefly- by public ophlon. 
Beoause ot the prestige of the tribunal m&n1 felt that it the .ltuation 
.... rranted it, Congress should ignore the honest ophion of the Court, but 
oertainly Dot deba.e that body in order to get favorable deoisions. Speeohes 
were _de and artio18s appeared deteDd.hg the existing arrangement of the 
Court. S.e apologists att8lllpted to show, by previoua Court deaisiODs, that 
it .8 aotually h agreement with CODgreas in. wishing to extend national 
authority. Others tlayed the six ... -.jorit,. proposal aa a ridioulous ldea 
that would aooaapli8h nothiBg. As th8 Hation sarcastically- PQt it • ••• it 
affirms that a8 long aa tiTe judg8a might declare a law unconstitutional the 
iDalienable right. of _D ... re in danger of violatioD but when six are _de 
Decessary for the job the oourt beoomes quite harmless.·36 
1'_ reaaon tor the OOJlllllotion,was, ot oourse, the validity ot the newl,.. 
pas.ed Reoonatruotion Aots. A. thhgs stood, all indicationa pointed to the5r 
nullificatioD by the Court. whioh Congress meant to prevent b,.. any _ana 
possible. Concerning thb phase of the struggle, the Hation took the .tand 
-
....... _---------.. 
16 Bation (:Iew York), January 30, February 20, 1868. 
~. 
~~------------------------~----------------------------, 
"hich the court itselt -.s ult_te17 to acoept. 
But are .... then. in tavor ot 
alloriJ1g the Supreme Court to .et 
aside the Reoonstruotion Aot., B7 
no JI88llS. We think the Court lias 
nothing to do with the prooes. ot 
reoonstructicm and ouCht not to 
.. ddle with it. !he ... jority in 
Congres8 however does not go a. 
tar as we do, it aoknowledges tla:t 
the Court i1 .et aside the Reoonstruotion 
Act, but 5: saY8 it cannot do 1t 
by' les.than six Totes. For our-
selves, we oonfess ... are UD&ble 
to .ee the ... lue ot this distino-
tion. It six judges can undo ••• 
all that Congre .. bas done and il 
doing ...... are nei'J;her reassured 
nor consoled by the retlection 
that it cannot be .000e b7 tlve.3'1 
• 
!he bill in question tailed. and serious talk of reorganization ended 
until 1869. when another justioe _s added and nine n8IJ oircuit judges were 
oreated.38 !ho Court itself' _s apparentq atfected deeply by' the critical 
dtuation 1t tound itself in. During the reainder of the period it evinoed. 
a willingness to bend. in order not to break. 
!he aot of bending -.s to involn the Reconstruction Aots. !he orir;iDal 
aot had been passed on )laroh 2, 186'1 over the Teto ot President J olmson, who 
had quoted the Supre. Court deoision in the Milligan case as a pLrtial 
reason tor hie aotion. It atated that no legal governments existed in the 
ten unreoonstructed state •• and DO ad.equate proteotion tor life and property. 
!ho governments of Linooln and Jomson .... re d.eolared to have no legal status, 
/ 
aDd were subjeot to the authority of the United states to modit,y or abolish 
.----._ ... _-----
3'1 Ibid., January 30. 1868. 
-
38 Ibid •• December 12, 1869. 
-
~----' ----------, 
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tbeJl as it pI_sed. The aot diY1ded the South into tlve lIilita17 distriots. 
with lIil1ta17 tribunals to super.ed. oivil oourt. wherever neoe88a17. It 
lett the 11I.petua tor aotual reoonstruotion to the states them.a.1 .... s. The 
latter. however. took no aotlon. apparent~ preterring militar,y rule to the 
type ot reoonstruotion ordered by Congress. Consequently. a auppleMllta.17 
aot _s passed on Karoh 23rd whioh torced reconatruotion prooeedinga by 
direoting the milita17 oommanders to regiater the tr.ed~ aDd tranchised 
white •• bold elections tor state cODY8Dtlons. and tor ratitioation or rejec-
39 
tion ot state constitutions. 
Approximately a month atter the passage ot the aot three promine~t 
southerner.. Governor 1I'i111am Sbarkq or Ki.s1asippi. AleDllder Garland. and 
Robert Walker asked leave ot the Supr ... Court to tile a plea enjoining the 
President trom entorcing the ReoOBatruotion .lots. It _a a bold move OIl 
their part and. :u.tural1y. oreated quit. a turore. any people t.eling t_t 
the rebels were t17ing to win baok in the oourtroom what they hI.d lost on 
the battletield. J omaon ..... aooused by the radioala ot organizing 'bhe 
attempt to subvert the acta. Sharkey denied this &l'lCl olaimed when the Pres-
ident _a notitied he expressed neither approval nor disapprcmt.l.40 Jobaon 
had in taot instruoted Attorn"1-General 8tanbe17 to objeot to the action on 
the groanda that the Pr.sident oould not b. aued. in spite ot the taot that 
--.... --.. -----_ ... 
39 Walter LJDWOod Fleming. The S.iUe1 ot A;er;rttox (ChrOBiolea ot .&.merioa. 
edited by Allen JomaOl1)7Yale niversiv r •••• New Lven. 1919. lU4. 
40 Springfi.ld ReebUoan. April 13. 186'7. 
42 
he persODAl1,. oOllsidered the aots illegal, and had previousl,. vetoed thea.41 
A week atter the petition was filed, the right of the Supr ... Court to 
hear the ca8e 11&8 argued. The petitioners ba8ed their olaim to be heard on 
the Aaron Burr treason trial tor whioh President Jetterson .... s subpoenaed b7 
Chief Justioe -.riJh&ll. StaDber,-, on the other hand, .... rned against allow-
ing the judioia..,. to' oontrol the executive. 
The results of the argQmeDt were watohed caretull,. and debated oease-
les817 in the three day8 following, betore the Court gave its decision. 
Sbarkey and Walker were attaoked. by a Radical pre88 tinged with both ven_ 
and fear. The tension was inorea8ed by the faot that a ma.jority of tive 
justioe8 were oonsidered to be again8t the Reoonstruotion Aot8.42 It theae 
voted for taking juri.diotion, invalidation of the aots would come 800B 
thereafter. ~ Independent oomraented olairToyantly on the Court' 8 probabl. 
action: 
There is but one opinion here aJIlong .. 
ot all parties, aa to the resultJ the Court 
will refuse to grant leave; this tribuDal, 
already suspeoting that, as now oonstituted, 
it i. regarded as a dese.sed member of the 
body politio, will not run the risk of aapa-
tation by touohing the edged too18 of Slarkey 
u.d lfalker.'3 
As predicted, the Court avoided any olas,h b,. refusing jurisdiction on 
the grounds that it bad no authority to control the President. A8 the peti-
tioners had cited the Burr trial to show that the Court had a preoedent for 
.. _ ......... _-.. _-_ ..... 
41 )(il ton, 431. 
42 James Ford Rhodes, Ristorz 2!.!!!! United States, Jlacm11lan Company, llew 
Yort, 1910, VI, 74. 
43 IndependeR (llew Yort), April 16. 87; oited 
r 
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oontrolling presidential aotions, so the Oourt used the same example, oiting 
Jefferson's disregard of the subpoena. to prove the point of the Court. The 
. 44 
opinion was ummimOU8, with Ohief' Justioe Chase giving the opinion. 10 
mention was _de of' the supposedly signifioant deoision in the Kil1igan 08.8e. 
As a .tter of f'aot, oounsel for the plaintift, Charles 0' Conor bad not eYen 
45 
used it in his argument. 
Chase t s opinion pu.t lIlloh more stress on preoedent and results than on 
reason and 10gio, a possible indication that the Court realized the weakness 
of its legal position. He oited the oontroversy over the annexation of' 
Texas, deolaring that though the oonstitutionality ot annexation prooeedings 
was questioned, no one sought to enjoin the President trODl oarrying it out. 
He then presented the unenviable position of' the Court. It, bY' any ohance, 
it should uphold the injunotion and the President refused to oomplY' with it, 
the Oourt was 1t'ithout power to enforoe its decision. It, on the other band. 
the President should submit to the injunotion, in direot violation of an 
Aot of' Oongress, he might be subjeot to Impeaobment. He negleoted, ot 
oourse, to mention that it was the dutY' ot the Court to deoide on the oon-
stitutionality ot the law involved, so that if' the President refrained trOll 
enforoing it he would not be subjeot to impeaohment.4S 
In the opinion, however, the Court lett an opening tor the South. 
Although stating that the President oou1d not be enjoined, it admitted that 
-----_ ... _--.. -.... 
44 1li •• is.fiR! va. Johnson, 4 Wallaoe 415. 
45 lUlton, 134. 
46 Oushman, 164-1. 
.-
his subordiDates might be. oiting. as one example. the famous Gase of 
47 lfarburz va. Madison. An "en more applioable 08.se mentioned was Little vs. 
Barre.. 2 Cranoh 110 (1804). in whioh an A.merioan naval oOJllDl8l1der 111111 held 
liable tor damages involving inju17 to property. as a result 01' oarry1ng out 
the provisions at a proclamation issued by President Adams.48 
The South took quiok advantage ot this possibility. Governor Jenkins 
of Georgia filed a similar applioation with the Court but avoided Mis8i8s-
ippi f 8 error by' direoting it a't Seoretary ot 1I'ar S'banton. General ot the 
J;rnty Grant. and the commander ot the military district ot .. hioh Georg1&. _8 
a part. At the aame time he issued a procl.a.Jation to 'the people ot Georgia. 
stating that the constitutionaliii7 of the Reoonstruotion Acta devolved solely 
on the Supreme Court to deoide. as the issue bad placed the other two 
branches 01' governaent in direot antagoni8lll to eaoh other. IDa8llll1oh a8 the 
Court had not ;yet spcken. and iDa8lll1ch as its decrees Yere abOVe veto. he 
hoped that this decision would arrest Congre8sional usurpation.49 
Al'though the country might not agree with Jenkins point ot view. there 
was general approval ot the Court' a deoision to admit the application against 
Stanton and Grant. This was based on the hope that the Supreme Court Would 
say at once whether it would rule on Reconstruotion. and thus. give the 
program SOJIle _asure 01' oertitude oonoerning its oontiDued existenoe. The 
-......... _-.. _ ... --.. 
41 1 Cranoh 137. 
48 Cushman. 165-7. 
49 Milton. 437-8. 
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radical Independent, in voicing this hope, praotically admitted the uncon-
atitutionality of the Reconstruction Aots: 
The whole South will understand at onoe 
that the Court will not step in between Con-
gress and rebels, not at present oertainly, 
and not early enough in any event to do any 
good or harm. As a .tter of Gourse, in due 
time, a case can be made up in one of the 
interior oourts against the Military .lot, 
but a deoision ot the Supreme Court oould 
not be reasonably expeoted betore 1869. 
By that ti1lle the rebelli"M states will be 
thoroughly reoonstruoted. 
In spite of the legal loophole. ottered in Miaaissippi vs. Johnson, 
the Suprae Court unanimously di_is.ed the suits against Stanton and Grant 
as being parely political in obaraoter. Chiet Juatice Chaae, speakiDg tor 
the Court, ruled that jurisdiction could not be acoepted beoause the suit 
involved no question oonoerning person or property, merely' the rights of a 
questionable government. Miasissippi then made a last desperate attempt to 
bring the .lots before the Court, by aaking permission to amend their appli-
cation so aa to involve person or property. A reargument was heard on this, 
but the amendment was finally disallowed by an equally divided court, Wayne, 
Clifford, Nelson, and Field favoring, and Chase, Davis, Swayne, and Miller 
opposed. As in the Milligan case, the same split prevailed between pr ...... r 
and wartime appointments. 
Justice Grier was abaent trom this hearing because ot illness, and thu. 
did not vote. Ilia presenoe might well have ohanged the whole pioture, &a he 
... ----....... -_ .... 
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was believed to be in tavor of adldtting the plea. In addition. he had 
voted consistently with the other pre-.ar justices in all previous deoia-
51 
ions. 
The Bation exhaustively 5Ummarized the likely results stemming troathe 
deoisions on the Reconstruotion Aota: 
----.. _--....... .-... -
UndoubtedlY'. it is no light latter that 
the highest Court in the land should thus 
disola1m the power ot inquiring into the 
oonatitutiaaali~ of an Aot of Congress 
deatr07ing the govermaent ot ten states. 
For it must be observed that eT'ery word ot 
lIr. Stanbery' a argument would be just as 
applicable if .s_obusetts. instead of 
Georgia. were the oomplainant. and it 
Congress had undertaken to cwerthrow a 
State government whioh it at the __ time 
admitted to be perfeotq legit.te. Bo 
Stat. in the Union. theretore, can rely 
upon the Supreme Court tor protection 
against the usurpation ot Congress. This 
is a gra?e taot whioh deaerves aerious 
oonsideration, and Y'et, notwithstanding 
all the perils of suoh a deoision. it is 
olear that it is justitied ~ reason and 
experi.no ••••• 
Pur.lY' political controversies are 
••• the least amenable to the jurisdiotion 
ot a Court. The origin and existenoe of a 
State, the .xistenoe and juatioe of a war, 
or the validitY" ot a revolutionar;y ohange 
in the torm. ot government are ••• questions 
which no nation e?er allowd Courts to 
deteraine •••• 
The immediate results ot the deois-
ion ••• ar. unqualifi.dly beneficial. ben 
it the suit had been merely .ntertained 
without a decision upon its merita, the 
effect upon the South _at have been injur-
ious, while it is ditficult to estimate the 
51 Warren. II. 463-4. 
misohief that might haTe been wrought by 
the entire suooe8S of the oamplaiDant. 
It oould not haTe saved the state from the 
ultimate oontrol of Oongress, and it 
would have introduoed el81Unts 01' evil 
into the oonflict. We think that every 
intelligent Southerner - oertainly every 
8hrewd lawyer or politioian - feels 
relieved by the deoision. Oertain17 it 
is a cau8e for oongratulation among all 
triends 01' regulated libert,y.62 
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Ar:1y re1iet or rejoioing waa to be ahort-lind, however. Obvious17, 
nothing lasting had been aooOllp11ahed by the legal gyrations 01' the Ooart. 
BY' denying Ie aTe to tile, that body had on17 saTed itself' froa aking an 
immediate deo1aion. In spite of its' aooepted politioal nature, the actual 
validity of the Reoonstruotion .lots had not 7et b .. n legally determined. It 
had only been made sate from injunotion. There had been no abatement of 
teeling between the opposing taotions as a result ot the KiBsissiPEi T8. 
Johnson and Georgia va. Stanton oases. The opponents ot the CongressiODal 
pro~ oould still be expeoted to blook it, if possible. 
On the basis ot ita previous deoisions, the Oourt was tiDally paahed 
into aooepting jurisdiotion in a oase tlw.t would teat the oonstitutionality 
of the Reoonstruotion .lots, that ot ex parte )loCardl., 6 Wallaoe :518. Para-
-
doxioal17, the case oame betore the Court through another .Aot 01' Congress 
that oertainly was not paased with suoh an intent in mind. In order to pro-
teot tederal ottioials and other loyal persons in the South against aotions 
of the state oourts, Congress had passed the .lot of February 5, 1867, 
----~----------
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• 
allowing appeal. tra lesser court to the Supreme Oourt in cases involving 
the writ ot habeas corpus. This right ot appeal bad, previously, been very 
limited, but now extended to "all cases where aD7 person '111&7 be restrained 
of his or her liberv", in violation ot the Constitution or ot ~ treat" or 
law ot the United States.,,53 Although designed to entorce Reconstruction, 
ironicalll' enough, the act was used to test its 'ftlldity. 
The case cam.e about through the actions ot an ex-Contederate colonel 
named MoOardle. Atter the war he bad becOJll8 editor ot a newspaper in Vicks-
burg, through which aedium he had vigorously attaoked Congress, the reoon-
.truotion policy, and the distriot oo1llDBDder, General Ord. The latter grew 
weary ot this in November 1861 and locked up McOardl" refusing him bail and 
privileges. McCardle sought reliet trom the Oircuit Court ot Misei.sippi 
but was unsuccesstul. While awaiting the deoision ot the military oourt by 
whom he liaS tried, his lawyer disoovered the previous Dl8lltioned Aot ot Con-
gress, and took the case to the Supreae Court in January 1868. 
The Radicals were alarmed by the JIlOV8 and tried to persuade Attorney. 
General Stanbery to resist the suit. The latter, however, tossed a bomb-
shell into the prooeedings by flatly retusing to represent the government as 
he had advised the President that he considered the Reconstruction Aots 
unoonstitutional. The War Department, at whom the ca.e .... s directed, then 
engaged Senator L)'1all Trumbull, Matthew Carpenter, and Ja_s Hughes. To 
McCardle's detense ca_ Jeremiah Black, David Dudl87 Field, and the now 
.. --.. -.... -~-.-~ .... 
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notorious Willia1ll Sharkey. The hearing waa speed1l7 8et tor the tirst Kon-
de:y in Jlaroh.54 
The intervening aonth and a halt was very busy. Although the Indiana-
Lolia Journal stated that the outcome ot the trial _s unimportant as, by 
the time it was deoid.ed, Reconstnotlon would be so tar advanoed that it 
55 
would JlBte no ditterenoe, Congre8s apparently thought ditferently. It 
had been variously reported that the judges had divided on the question ot 
a hearing tor the case, Grier, Clifford, Helson, Davis, and Field favoring 
one, with Chase, &.yne, and Killer opposed. It waa conaequently assumed 
that the case would be decided by the 8"" _rgin. 
As a result, Congres8 went to work and the House prOJllptly prepared the 
previ~sl7 mentioned bill that would. require two-thirds of the Court to 
decide a question ot oODstitutlonallt,y, or in this case, six justioes - one 
more than the 1It&jorit7 .... s presumed to have. Thaddeus stevens then intro-
duoed a more stringent one that would refuse the Court jurisdiotion in any 
caaes 1nvolTiDg the Reconatruotion .lots. Stevens' bill tailed but the "two-
thirds bill" passed the House, 116 to 39, in spite ot the aoausations ot its 
opponents that it __ a subversion ot the Court and an open admission ot 
guilt.56 
The bill tailed to pass the Senate, however, in spite ot the ettorts ot 
the government oounsel, SeDator Trumbull. Senator Doo1ltt1e ot Wisoonsin 
.. _-_ .. ,.. ... __ .-. ..... _-
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oa11ed the bill an outrageous ettort to prevent vOiding of the 40ts whioh 
ri .... justioes were reported1;,. against, to whioh Trumbull replied, "If it be 
true, then I sa;,. these tive judges are W&1IlOUS and should be impeaohed 
tomorrow.,,57 Trumbull allo introduoed Stevens' House bill in the Senate 
bUt it again tailed. 
The Court at thia time gave out the full opinions in the Georgia va. 
stanton caae whioh mal' bave, in part, caused Congress to temporaril;y drop , 
legi.la.tive aotion. The Radicals were exultant, assuming that the Court 
would certainly oonsider the Gaae at hand as 'being political in soope. 
Nation aoberl;,. pointed out tbat there was no reason to eXPeot suoh an 
aotion, as the Court bad already taken jurisdiotion b7 setting a hearing. 
The Court waa then, ot oourse, already oognisant ot its reaaoning in Georgia 
vs. Stanton, and would have aquelohed the KoCardle oase there had it tol-
lowed that line.58 
The torthooming case waa .... 11 aired by the press. Justioe Field bas 
stated in hia _moira t_t the subjeot was thoroughl;,. exhausted b7 the tillle 
the case was heard. All the arguments .. re widel;,. published and the general 
impresaion was that the Aota oould not be upheld, as they were "revolution-
ary and de8truotiTe of a aepublioan torm ot government 1n the state ••• 59 
On JanWU7 31at and February 1st, a preliminary hearing had been held 
--_._---.. _-.----
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• to deoid. whether the Court should take jurisdiotion. As expeoted, juris-
diotion had been assumed in spit. ot violent arguments against it at the 
hearing, and on )laroh 2nd the aotual argu1l8nts on the ease itselt began. 
These were oontinued on the 3rd, 4th, and 9th ot Jlaroh, at which tiae the 
Court took the case under advilement. Acoording to Justioe Field, the 
deoilion Ihould have been handed down on the 21st. Three days atter the 
60 
arguments, however, Congress intervened. 
Although Tl'WIbull and his colleagues had confidently boasted that they 
had "rattled the bones" ot the Justioes, the Radicals were teartul ot the 
outcome. Their paper, the Independent, bad predioted a five to three vote 
holding the Aots invalid. 
As a consequence, it was determined by Congre.siODal leaderl to remove 
the oale trom the jurisdiction ot the Court although by the time the bill 
liaS prepared the cale had been reoeived, argued, and brieted. .t.t the time, 
the House had betore it a bill that would extend the appellate jurisdiotion. 
of the Supreme Court to inolude oases involving au.toms and revenue otti-
oials. Representative Sohenk ot Ohio, ohairman of the Republican Congress-
ional committee, had informed the House that its oonsideration and passage 
were purely a .tter ot routine. As a result, the Demoorats were ott 
guard when Representative Wilson ottered an amendment to the bill, repeal-
ing appellate jurisdiotion of the Court under the Habeas Corpus .lot ot 1867, 
"and to prohibit the oourt fro. exeroiaing ~ jurisdiotion on any appeals 
... ---_ .. _-------
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"bioh bad been or Jlight be taken under its terms."Sl This, of oourse, 118.. 
the aot by which the )4oCardle case had been brought before the Supreme Court. 
The bill 118.8 passed without objeotion or oOlBl18nt and went to the Senate 
tor oonourrenoe. There, for the first time, the full import of the bill 
was realized. Sohenk: was bitterly aooused of deoeit and fraud by the nemo-
orata tor using his position to oommit suoh trioker,r. 
Sohenk boldly aTowed his aotion, .ying of the Court, 
••• the" usurp power wheneTer they dare 
to 'W1dertake to settle questions pure11 
political in regard to the status of the 
states. If I find them ••• attempting to 
arrogate to the1ll8elTeS jurisdiotion under 
a statute that happens to be on the reoord 
from whioh they olaia to deriTe that juris-
diotion, and I can take it awa1 from them 
by a repeal ot that statute, I will do it •••• 
I hold it to be not only my right, but my 
dutr as a representatiTe of the people, to 
olip the wings of that Court.62 
It is difficult to see what .... s gained by this perfonanoe in the House •. 
Although the bill passed the Senate, it was rejected in a sizzling Teto by 
Johnson just prior to his impeaohment. Ilaturally, it had to make its way 
through Congress again, this ti_ ~th the stigma of deoeption on it. The 
Congressional leaders 1Bllst oertainly haTe known that Johnson would Teto it, 
unless they gambled that he Jligbt apprOTe it to saTe himself from iapeaoh-
'IIlent. 
If so, they misjudged the President, who, if nothing else, had the 
-------,..-----_ .. 
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unbounded courage or his convictions. In vetoing the bill, he pointed out 
that it establ1shed a precedent that would sweep aside all checks on uncon-
,titutional legislation, and further stated that the Oourt 
••• has been viewed b,y the people as 
the true expOQllder of their Oonstitution, 
and in the most violent party oonfliots, 
its judguaents and decrees have always been 
sought and deferred to with confidence and 
respect • 
• • .Any act which -'1' be construed 
into, or mistaken tor, an attempt to pre-
y~t or evade its deci8iona on a question 
which affects the liberties of the citizens 
and agitates the country, cannot fail to be 
attended with unpropitious consequenoes. 
It will be juatl;r held b,y a large portion 
of the people, as an admission of the uncon-
stitutionality' of ~ an on Which its judg-
ment may be forbidden or forestalled.SS 
The bill was &rgued bitterly the second time through, particularly in 
the Senate. There the hopelesslY outnumbered Democrats, led by Doolittle, 
Buckalew, Reverdy Jolm.son, and Hendricks, taunted the Radicals meroilessly. 
Senator Trumbull, vho was largely responsible for the enactment of the bill, 
commented in the (lourse of the debate that all this uproar was unnecessary. 
The bill was a. minor one, no oases were pending, and we had gotten along 
very well betore tb.e passage of the act now up for repeal. Doolittle then 
scorched the Radicals by asking if, as Trumbull stated, there were no bills 
pending, wbr the an~dment specifically repealed jurisdiction in pending 
cases. In spite of all eftorts, however, the bill easily carried the Senate 
by a vote 01' 33 to9, and the next day squeezed through the House over the 
---_ .. _--------.. 
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While the legislative branoh was aoting, the Court stood quietly by. 
Arguments on the MoCardle ca.e had been oonoluded eighteen days before the 
tinal passage ot the limiting act and there was muoh talk as to whether the 
Court would hand down a deoision while the bill .s still pending. The!!! 
york Tribune stated that they must in order to preserve their own digni t)r; 
-
that all except Swayne and Miller would hold the Reoonstruction Aots 
unconstitutional. oonoluding with the statement, "The decision is made up, 
and they have the power and the right to deliTer it. Whether they have the 
nerve to be an independent Judioiary remains to be seen.w65 SOBe advooates 
ef the Court claimed that the new law _ • .!!. :eost facto in this situation as 
the case bad already been argued. 
The Court, however,. deoided to .. it on the Congress,. and voted to post-
pone the deoision, Grier and Field dissenting.S6 Immediately, Jeremiah 
Blaok, oounsel tor McCardle, moved tor a hearing on the question ot the right 
ot Congress to abolish jurisdiction in pending oases. The Court agreed to 
hear the question on April 2nd but as this did not give Black sufficient time 
to prepare his briet, the case was postponed until the next term. In the 
... __ .... _----_ .... --
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tneamrhile, the Court retused to hear any cases involving the same lleuea. 
The Court itaelf' _15 torn asunder by its aotion ot postponement. Justioe 
Grier, in partioular, was very bitter, and issued a publio statement ot hi. 
teelings on the matter, in whieh Justice Field ooncurred. He said: 
Thi. caae wa. full,.. argued 
in the begilming of this month. 
It 1. a case which involves the 
libert,r and righta, not onl,.. of 
the appellant, but of millions of 
our tell. cithens. The country 
and the partie. had a right to 
ex~ct that it would reoeive the 
iJlllediate and solemn attention 
of the Court. By the postpone-
ment ot this case, we a ... l1 nb-
jeot ourselves, whether justly 
or unjustly, to the imputation 
that we have evaded the pertorm-
anoe ot a duty impoaed on us by 
the Constitution, and waited for 
Legislative interposition to 
supersede our aotionand relieve 
us from responsibiliqr. I am 
not willing to be a partaker of 
the eulogy or opprobrium. that 
may follow. I oan only -1' ••• 
I am ashamed that suoh oppro-
brium should be oast upon the 
Court, and that it cannot be re-
futed.61 
The Republicans reoeived Grier's oomments .ourly. oalling them an 
"unaeeml,.. exhibition •••• an extra-judioial opinion •••• tantamount to aoousing 
his Assooiates on the Benoh of malveraion in otfice." Gideon Welles, speak-
ing for the anti~adical toroes called Grier and Field the only "men, 
patriots, judges of nerve and honest independenoe" in the Court. The others 
he aooused either ot tear of the Radioals in Congress or, in the oase ot those 
with Democratic leanings, ttthey are willing their party ahould triuaph 
.......... _--_ ...... -... 
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through Radical folly and wickednesa.w68 
In the interim, pending &mlouncement of the decision, feeling ran high. 
An example of the passions that could be uooaed conoerned a ludicrous story 
inVolving Justioe Field. Field had been invited to a dinner given by 
Seoretary of the Trea8ury McCullooh. He waa forced to leave early, however, 
and his plaoe was taken by a lateoomer, ex-Governor RodJllan Price of New 
Jersey. In the oourse of the evening, the latter, commenting on the current 
judicial situation, _id that the "whole reoonstruotion measures 'Would soon 
be t smashed up' and sent to ldngdQlll OOlle." A reporter present questi oned a 
waiter as to the identity of the speaker, and waa informed from the plaoe 
oard that it was Justice Field. He naturally hurried out with what he con-
sidered a choice scoop. 
Upon publication of the inoident, there were great repercussions, even 
to an investi~tion ordered by the House of Representatives to see it bapeach 
ment proceeding8 were warranted. The case of mistaken identity finally came. 
out, however, and the affair was dropped quietly_ 69 
It was during this time that iIlpeaohlll811t proceedings were brought a~inat 
Andrew Jo}mson. The faotors oreating this situation lad been building up for 
about a rear, since the passage of the Tenure of Office Act in March 1867_ 
By this act the President was refused the right of reaoving his oabinet 
officers without the oonsent of ~angres8, and partioularly, was forced to re-
---... _---_ ........ 
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tain Seoreta17 Stanton in his cabinet because Congress would not sanotion hi. 
removal. In August of 1867, the President had fired Stanton because the 
latter bad refused to resign, and had appointed General Grant as Secretary to 
resign, and had appointed General Grant as Seoretary .!! _Ut_t_e_r_im_. In appoint .. 
ing Grant, Johnson made an understanding with him that he would hold the 
position regardless of Congressional approval or rejeotion. In this way, 
Stanton would be forced to go to the courts to regain his position. This was 
entirely satisfactory with Johnson who felt that the Supreme Court would 
certainly rule the Tenure of Office Act invalid. 
The plan failed because Grant failed to keep the bargain, giving up the 
office to Stanton when Congress demanded his reinstatement. In February 
1868, Jobnson defied Congress by again removing Stanton. This action reaulte 
in his impeachment the following month.70 
The validity of the Tenure of Office Act never oame before the Supreme 
Court at this time. Aa a result, Johnson was impea9hed for defying a law 
that he believed to be unconstitutional without having a chance to teat ita 
constitutionality. It is doubtful whether a court deciaion on the Tenure of 
Office Act would have saved the President from impeachment, however. As earl 
a8 December 1866, resolutions had been introduced in Congress for that pur-
pose.71 The legislature was obviously bent on remOVing Jolmson. 
On the other hand. it must be remembered that the violation of the Tenur 
of Office Act by the President was the overt act around which the whole fabric 
....... _---... _-.. _--
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of 1apeaobment _. wayen. The aooompanying oharge. were notably nebUlous. 
Without the tormer, iapeaobment .ight not bave resulted. 
The Court 0&11 hardl,.. be blamed in this instanoe, however. It had no 
opportunity to test the law, and oertainl,.. had no intention ot hunting tor an 
opportunity. This would have been a questionable praotice in normal time, an 
p08aibl,.. 8uicidal in this period.72 
.laide trom the deteotion ot Grant, Johnson bad one other opportunit,.. to 
te.t the aet. When he had removed Stanton tor the seoond time, he bad 
appointed General Lorenzo ThOJBas in hia atead. In theqea ot Congress and 
Stanton, the President's aetion had DO legal ettect, but tearing that Thomas 
might torcibly attem.pt to remove him, as Thomas had threatened, Stanton 
issued a warrant tor his arreat. 
In this instance, it _ • .A.ttorney-General Stanbery who missed the 
opportunity. When informed ot Thomas' arrest, he did not otter to represent 
him but told the general to go along to court. ThOJDas 11&. proaptly released 
on bail and the chance to obtain a writ ot habeaa oorpg. to teat the law was 
lost. 
Johnson did not give up. He immediately retained Walter S. Cox to bring 
the ease betore the Supre.e Court. When ThOllas' o&se came up tor trial, he 
--.. ---------...... 
72 Aa a matter ot reoord, it was not until 1926 in the o&se of !rera va. 
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was surrendered into the custody of the District Court from which the warrant 
had been obtained, and. his attorney refused to renew bail. 
Distriot Judge David X. Cartter, a staunch Republioan, was frightened 
by this turn of events and refused to accept Thomas into custody but instantl, 
dismissed the case, preventing any further act1on.73 
The impeachment trial began on March 6, 1868, during the arguments on 
the McCardle case. Chief Justice Chase was forced to leave the hearing to 
offioiate at the trial, another tactor in the postponement of the Court's 
deoision on that case. 
It 1I8.S in this trial that Chase reached the height of his career. Prior 
to this time, his judicial record had not been one of notable opposition to 
Congress, having taken their side in the Milligan, Teat Oath, and Reoon-
struction Cases. In the impeaohment proceedings, however, the Chief Justice 
stood out tor his just, impartial, and tearless handling of the trial. Hia 
right to preside .... s immediately attacked by some, as he had often acted as 
an adviser to the President. To oheok on his aotions during the trial, and 
to be sure that he was not in oollusion with Jomson, the Congressional 
leaders went 80 tar as to assign detectives to the Chief Justice to report on 
him. 74 
Chase and Congress first clashed on his right to vote in the trial. The 
Chief Justice felt he was entitled to at least a "tie-breaker" as aooorded 
the Vice President, but Congress ruled otherwise, inasmuch as the issue of 
impeachment was still in doubt. While still sitting as a legislative body, 
..... -.. _----_ .. _--
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• the Senate tixed the nles under which it would operate as a Court ot Im.peaoh-
mente Chase 1nturiated Congress b,.. rejeoting th1s action and ordering that a 
neW' body ot rules be adopted when they t1nall,.. sat as a Court. 
When the trial commenoed. Chase gave notice that the trial would tollow 
aocepted legal prooedure. by taking the oath ot the Supreme Court betore 
initiating the proceedings. In the course of the trial be tinall,.. deteated 
the Senate on his right to vote. He had ruled as admissible a ainor question 
raised by Stanbery. 'fhe radicals objeoted. not on the question, but on 
Chase's right to rule on it. 'fhe probl •• was debated tor .everal hwra 
without result and tiDall,.. a motion was made that the Senate retire tor a 
conterenoe. The votblg on the motion resulted in a tie wMrwpon Chase 
oaW,.. aJUloUlloed the verdiot. voted tor the motion, and .:jestioall,.. strode 
into the conterenoe rOQB. In oenterenoe, a motion to take away Chase's vote 
lost, the tirst break in the Radioal front. 
'fhese were very trying times tor the Chiet Justioe, even excluding the 
trial itselt. Inveotive, abusive letters, spies, threats ot political 
oblivion, sooial ostraoism, and denunoiation as an apostate to the party all 
oonverged on hta. He defended his aotions stoutl,.., oalling talk ot his 
allianoe with J oms on absurd, and statingl 
)(y duties are judioial. What 
I honestly believe the Constitu-
tion and 1& .... to sanotion or oon-
demn, that I JllUst, fearless, an-
ctien or oODdemn. I 8JD. ot no par-
t,' on the Benoh. It I belieTe an 
aot, or part ot an act, ot a Rep-
ublioan Congres8 to be Ullconstitu-
tional. I lDtl8t say so. It a ~ 
whoa Republioans would gladq see 
oondemned has rights, and I _at 
judge, the rights shall be respeoted. 
And 80 of the Demoorats. I expeot to 
please neither at all times. But, 
God helping me, I will do ~ duty, 
sorry on17 that limited powers do not 
allow me to do it better. 75 
61 
On three oocasions during the trial Chase attempted to bave testimony 
admitted that was neoes8ary for a defense of Johnson; first, a deolaration 
tbat all the cabinet members oonsidered the Tenure of Offioe .lot unconsti-
tutio:oal, and that S .. rd and Stanton were to 'Write the veto; 8eoond, that 
it _s agreed on b;y the cabinet that no appointees of Lincoln would come 
'" 
under the law; and third, that the cabinet agreed to test its legality b7 
76 
dismissing Stanton. The Se:oate refused to aooept any of thes. as evidenoe, 
and it was here that the tide definitely turned in Johnson' 8 favor as enough 
Radioals were disgusted b7 the patent unfairness of the trial that aoquittal 
became a distinot possibility. Chase himself _s greatly disappointed by the 
Senate's aotion, oonoeiving of no evidenoe more proper for admi8sion. In a . 
letter to Garrett Smith the next day he wrote: 
_______ .. ____ ao __ 
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Nothing is olearer to ., mind 
than that Aots of Congress, not 
warranted by the Constitution, are 
not laws. In case a law 'believed by 
the President to be uuwarranted by 
the Constitution, is passed, notwith-
standing his veto, it seems to me that 
it 1s his duty to exeoute it preoisely 
as if he lad held it to be constitu-
tional, exoept in the case where it 
direotly attacks and impairs the exeou-
tive power oonfided in him by that 
instl"UJllent. In that case it appears to 
me to be the clear duty of the President 
to disre~rd the law. so far at least as 
it _y be neoessa17 to bring the question 
of its oonstitutionality before the judi-
oiary tribunals •••• 
How can the President tulfi1l his 
oath to preserve. protect and detend the 
Constitution. if he has no ~igh.t to defend 
it against an'Act of Congre~cerely 
believed by him to have been passed in 
violation of itt To me. therefore. it 
seems perfeotly olear that the President 
had a perfeot right, and indeed. was under 
the highest obligation. to remove 
l4'r. Stanton, if he made the removal not 
in wanton disregard of a Constitutional 
law, but with a linoere belief that the 
Tenure of Offioe Act was unconstitutional, 
and for the purpose of bringing the ques-
tion before the Supreme Court.71 
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The trial ended on May 26, 1868, with the President's aoquittal b,y a 
single vote, and Chase returned to the Supreme Court a more honored man. 
Ear~ the following year. the Court made final disposition of the 
McCardle case. On April 12. 1869 a unanimous verdict was rendered rejecting, 
jurisdiction as a result of the reoently passed prohibitive law. The law 
itself was upheld in the decision by Chase who stated for the COurt that al-
though this jurisdiotion had been conterred on the Supreme Court by the Con-
stitutioll. it was oonterred "with such exoeptions and under suoh regulations 
8,S Congress shall _ke." The submission of the Court to legislative author-
ity resolved the problem and, as one author has stated, " ••• what might have 
, 18 
beoome a oause oelebre went down in the reoords as a judicial abortion." 
._----.--_ ... --. 
17 Milton, 564-5. 
18 Alfange. 79. 
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• The last important attempt to test the Reconstruction Acts was the case 
ot .!: parte Yerger, 8 Wallace 85, in Ootober 1869. Like MoCardle, Yerger 
n-.d been an editor wbo had been denied a writ of habeas oorpus and had 
appealed. The latter, however, based his appeal on the original JUdioiary 
Aot ot 1789, and jurisdiction was acoepted by the Court. 
Congress then went into action again. Senator Trumbull reported a 
bill "to define jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in oertain cases." The 
bill observed that judioial power doe. not embraoe political power, nor doe. 
the judiciary have any authority to question political decisions of the 
other branches of the government; therefore, it demanded that the courts be 
bound by any deoisions ot the political departments. The Reconstruction 
laws were, ot oourse, declared political in oharaoter, and would be com-
pletely removed trom any court jurisdiction, including those cases involving 
79 habeas corpus. 
The bill was attacked quite generally, tor placing Congress above the 
Constitution, and for refusing to allow the Supreme Court to be the judge 
ot its own jurisdiction. The Nation whimsically asked, "If a majority of 
Congress is sure not to do wrong, why have any Constitution at al11 ~ 
restrain this body of sages by any restrictions whatever? Wl'q' not let them 
80 
make their own Constitution, every ae .. ion'l· 
The !!!! ~ Herald delved into political theory and decided that the found-." , I 
ing fathers visualized Congreas as a heterogeneous group conceivably not 
79 Warren, II, 492-3. 
80 Nation, Deoember 2, 1869. 
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• learned in law, and had thus oreated a court of experts to guard the people's 
rights.8l Any d:iD.lnution of court power, therefore, was dangerous to the 
liberty of the people. Even the arch-RePllblican Independent felt the bill wa 
needless as the Supreme Court had already bowed to Congress' will in the 
McCardle o&se.82 
Before any act10n was taken, however, the case was settled by agreement 
of both counsel. Yerger was turned over to the oivil authorities, thus ful-
filling the PIlrpose of the petition.83 
The willingness of' both sides to settle the oase ref'leoted the feeling 
at the time. In this case, there was less desire to test the Reoonstruotion 
Acts, and more to obtain relief' for the :p1rtioular individual bef'ore the bar. 
As a result of' the deoi.ion in the MoCard~e oase, this became more and more 
the tendency. Pressure on the Court diminished and th~ Reoonstruotion Aots 
never did oome up f'or another test, mainly beoause there was very little 
ground lef't on which to'test them. As time passed, the need for a test 
diminished as well, as the Southern states were well along the road to re-
oonstruction. 
One other case was decided in 1869 which, although not primarily 
conneoted with reoonstruotion, was a refleotion of' the spirit of' it. This 
was Texas va. White, 7 Wallace 700, in whioh the doctrine of' secession was 
---._-----.--.. _-
81 Be. York Herald, Deoember 12, 1869. 
-----...... 
82 Independent, December 16, 1869; oited in Warren, II, 495.' 
83 Warren, II, 496. 
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forever laid to rest. 
The oase had its anteoedents in 1850 when the United States gave Texas 
ten million dollars in bonds, redeemable atter Deoember 31, 1864, in Bettle-
JIlent of boundary olaims. Texas itself' passed a law that the bonds were not 
to be made available until endorsed by the governor. After Texas had seoeded 
the law 1I8.S repealed and the bonds were used to defray war expenses. In 
1865, the military board oharged with obtaining neoessary material, made a 
contract with the defendant, White, giving him bonds in return for military 
supplies, although none of the bonds were endorsed by the governor. After 
the 1I8.r but before Texas had been reoonstructed, the new governor brought 
suit to regain the bonds and to prevent White from receiving payment for them 
The ease was brOught to the Supreme Court as an original action beoause 
the Constitution gave that body jurisdiction wherever one or more states were 
litigants. It 118.8 the claim of the defendant that the Court should not take 
jurisdiction inasmuch as Texas was not a m8lllber ot the Union at the time of 
transfer of the bonds. ~ven at this time Texas 1I8.S not represented in Con-
gress, and Radicals like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner still olaimed 
she 1I8.S not a .ember of the Union. 
The Supreme Court held differently, however, stating that Texas had 
never been out of the UnionJ that although she had given up her rights and 
privileges, she had never severed her oonstitutional ties. Speaking for the 
majori~. Chief Justice Chase declared that the Articles of Oonfederation had 
set up a perpetual union and the Constitution had perfected this union. 
The result of the case was not startling inasmuoh as the North had fought 
~--------------------------------------~ ~ 
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and won a oivil war against the prinoiple of seoession, and the Su~eme Court 
could be expeoted to oonfirm it legally. The deoision is more notable for 
the line of reasoning used by the Court to reaoh its oonolusions. It_s 
Chase t s beliet that the oountry as an entity, was older than the Constitution 
and at least as old as the individual states, by virtue of the first unitio-
atlon of the oolonies during the Revolutionary War. With this dootrine he 
exploded the theory that the sovereign states, and not the people, had 
oreated the tederal government. Apparently, then, a oitizen had as muoh 
reason and preoedent to be oonsidered a oitizen ot the United States as he 
had to be oonsidered a oitizen of his own particular state. It was a 
revolutionary dootrine and was destined to play an important };art in later 
oivil rights controversies.84 
Justioes Grier, Swayne, and Miller dissented, agreeing with the Con-
gre88ional viewpoint. Grier deolared that the case should be deoided by 
"political tact" and not "legal fiotion" and stated: 
If I regard the truth of history 
for the last eight years, I oannot dis-
oover the State of Texas to be a State 
of the Union, when Congress have deoided 
she is not.... Politically Texas is not 
a state in this Union. Whether right-
fully out of it or not is a question not 
betore the Court.8S 
The dissenting opinion seems somewhat narrOW'. Admitting the value ot 
"political taot", a ruling on the right of seoession had to oome out of the 
deoision. It White had been upheld it would mean that the Supreme Court 
84 Cushman, 30-1. 
8S Warren, II, 489 -90. 
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reoognized that Texas was out of the Union at the time of the bond -transfer, 
and, by implioation, reoognized the right of seoession. It was obviously 
better, in this instanoe, to gloss over existing conditions in order to 
destr~ a dangerous principle. 
As far a8 the Supreme Court was involved, the reoonstruotion period 
ended with the end of the decade. Though th8 South was to be under military 
rule until 1876, normal oonditions returned more quiokly and civil authorit,y 
expanded. As the power of the military lessened, so did petitions for 
relief addressed to the Court. By 1870, even the South had aooepted reoon-
struotion as an ineluotable fact. 
In retroapeot, the Court escaped serious damage during the reoonstruotiOJl 
period but only by invoking petty technicalities in order to avoid dangerous 
issuea. It oertainly resisted Congress muoh less resolutely than President 
Johnson, but, at the same time, inourred less of Congressional wrath. In so 
aoting, it retained practioally all the power that it possessed when the 
period opened, but disoreetly chose to bridle those powers, lest they be 
forcibly removed. 
Moreover, as a result of the turbulent decade it was naw bringing to a 
olose, the Court was subtly aftected by the trend of the time8. Though the 
oases involving reconstruotion stand out in boldest relief, there were numer-
ous other cases involving taxation, banking, and state and federal jurisdic-
tion that were deoided in tavor of the national government. As one author 
has desoribed the transition: 
The militanoy of the Reconstruotion 
Congress. however. represents merely the 
most virulent aspect of the protound ohange 
whioh the outoome of the Civil War brought 
about in .A.m.erioan politios. This ohange. 
whioh oan adequately be desoribed as the 
triumph ot nationalism. was retleoted in 
the oourse ot judioial stateoraft quite as 
olearly as the more obvious pressure. ot 
the radioal majority in Congress.86 
• 
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Although the deoline ot Radioal Republ10aniSDl would oause a tem.porary 
reaotion to set in, the Reconstruotion era detinitely established national-
imn as a judioial as well as politioal policy. 
------------_ .. _-
86 Alfange. 80-1. 
CHAPTER II I 
THE LEGAL TENDER CASES 
As we have seen, the bulk of Court business over this period ooncerned 
the pressing problem of reoonstruotion. Praotioally every political aot 
and its aftermath affeoted some faoet of this great program, and the Supreme 
Court was kept extremely aotive attempting to solve the judioial problems 
that were constantly arising. 
There were, however, occasional instanoes where the Supreme Court was 
asked to rule on legislation not direotly conneoted with the problem of 
reoonstruotion but still of great national importance. The legislation so 
involved was usually financial in scope, and the most important of this type 
evoked a series of deoisions, oommenoing in 1869, that are generally known 
as the Legal Tender Cases. 
Beoause of the importanoe of these deoisions, beoause of the singular 
manner in whioh they were deoided, and because of the oontroversial faots 
surrounding them, these cases have been treated as a separate entity. 
Certainly the results of these cases were more national in charaoter and 
mora far-reaohing in point of time than even the decisions stemming from the 
Reoonstruction Aots. 
The Legal Tender Aot bad been passed in 1862 as a war measure. It 
provided that paper currenoy, or "greenbacks", would be oiroulated in lieu 
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• of gold and silver. and would be redeemable in either of those speoie. The 
new ourrenoy was to be aooepted as legal tender for all private debts and 
publio dues. exoept impost taxes and interest on the national debt. inolud-
ing those transaotions predating the aot exoept where gold or silver was 
1 particularly speoified. 
At the time ot passage there was muoh protest against the aot as being 
destructive of our national eoon~. Even Secretary of the Treasury Cbase. 
at whose auggestion it was enaoted. urged it very relunotantly. and only as 
a wartime necessity. Nor did his attitude ohange with the ~ssage of the 
aot. Two years later. in 1864. he still deolared: 
)(y whole plan bas been that of a 
bullionist and not that of a mere paper 
money man. I have been obliged by neoes-
sity to substitute paper for specie for a 
time. but I have never lo~t sight ot the 
neoessity for reSQmption. 
In the period immediately after the war. however. Congress bad neither 
the time nor the desire to repeal the legislation. being engrossed in 
rebuilding the Southel"Il states and in fighting the President. In a like 
manner. more pressing problems prevented the Supreme Court from revieWing 
the act until nearly the end of the decade. exoept for one abortive oa.e in 
1863. At that time. the height of the war. the Court refused to risk a 
3 
olash with the war government. and denied itself jurisdiotion. 
1 Cushman. 222. 
2 J. W. Sohuokers. The Life and Publio Servioes of Salacm Portland Chase. 
D. Appleton and Company. New York. i874. 402. -
3 Roosevelt va. Meyer. 1 wa11aoe 512. 
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Six y .. r8 later it was obliged to admit its error on that point, and 
bear a similar cale. This, of oourle, has raised the question a8 to whether 
the Court, realizing that it could not con8cientiously validate the Legal 
Tenure Act in 1863, did not use the "no jurisdiction" exouse to avoid the 
issue. 
This seems to have been the case, but it appears to have made little 
differenoe in the tinal outcome. 'Warren bas stated, "Had the case been 
decided in 1863, instead ot in 1870, it is probable that the Le~l Tender 
Acts would have been held invalid by so large a 1II&jority that no attempt 
would bave been made to reverae the decision."' Wbile this may be true, 
there was oertainly no guarantee that the wartime government would bave res-
pected any suoh deoision, a tact whioh the Supreme Court realized when it 
prudently retused to hear the O&se. 
During this spall ot time between passage and review ot the aot, a new 
factor entered the picture. Although at tirst unpopular, the greenbaoks 
oame to be aocepted and grew in popularity among a large segment ot the pop-
ulation. More important, they became an integral part ot the .Amerioan 
finanoial system, to such an extent that a condemnation ot them would likely 
result in great tinanoial disturbanoe to the country. 
The fir8t ot the post .... r t.gal Tender Cases, Hepburn vs. Griswold, 
8 Wallaoe 603, came up in 1865 and was argued bet ore the Supreme Court in 
1861 on a writ ot error from. the Xentucq Coart ot Appeals. It involved a 
contraot entered into prior to the Legal Tender Act, on which the detendant 
-~---------.. -.. -
4 'Warren, II, 387. 
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• ):lad at first defaulted and then offered to pay in greenbaoks. The plaintiff 
had rejeoted the offer and held out for gold.5 
Because of the national importanoe of the issue, a reargument 1I8.S 
ordered for the next term at the request ot Attorney-General Stanber,y, in 
order that the gOTernment might be represented. Nothing, howeTer, was done 
about the oase in the 1868 tera, partially because the Court had now been 
reduoed to eight with the death of Wayne, and there was fear that an eTen 
6 
split might result. .As it eventually turned out, this was to make no dU .. 
terenoe as the case was finally deoided by eight justioes • 
.A number of assooiated oases were, nevertheless, deoided in 1868. 
Bank VI. SUpervisors, 14 U.S. 21, held that the greenbaoks were exempt from. 
state taxation without ruling on them as legal tender. Lane Oounty T8. 
Oregon, 1 Wallaoe 11, ruled that paper lIlOl1ey was not legal tender for pay-
ment of state taxes. Decisions on these two cases were unanimous. In 
Bronson TS. Rodes, 1 Wallaoe 229, h0W'8Ter, the Court began to split. It was' 
held in this decision, with Justice Miller dissenting, that the Legal Tender 
Act did not apply to contracts predating its passage that called for silTer 
and gold, and that oontract stipulations could not be fultilled by payment 
of United States notes. Justioes Swayne and Davis, while agreeing with the 
maj ori ty, filed a ooncurrent opinion in whioh they refused to be bound by 
any implications that might be drawn from the text of the opinion, or, 
speaking plainly, although this decision pointed to 1nva.lidation of the legal 
-_ .. __ .... -----_ .. -
5 .Alfange, 82 .. 3, 253. 
6 Warren, II, 501. 
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Tender Act, they refused to be considered as prepared to vote again-' the 
act. It iB significant of Chase's feelings on the subject that he wrote all 
three of these more or lea8 restrictive decisions.7 
On November 27, 1869, Hepburn VB. Griswold, was decided, nearly a year 
after the final argument. A minority of justices had asked for postponement 
of the decision as a new justice was due to be appointed under the Act of 
April 10, 1869 which had increased the membership of the Court to nine. The 
majority, led by Chase, and possiblY fearing a different decision, overruled 
them although the case had already had waited eighteen months without prea-
sure. 
Aocording to a statement signed by Justices Swayne, Miller, and Davis, 
published scme years atter the decision, the actual vote on Hepburn vs. 
Griswold was hardly an example of judicial excellence. When the vote was 
taken the result .... s an even split, thus upholding the act. Justice Grier 
had voted to uphold, in spite of his known belief in the unconstitutionality . 
of the law. Some of his colleagues believed he ..... voting against what he 
really wanted and tried to persuade htm to change his vote, but without suc-
cess. The Court then went on to the case of Broderick's Executor VI. YcGraw 
74 U.S. 639, dealing with the same subject. Here Grier reversed himself and 
voted against the aot. His colleagues pointed out his inconsistency where-
upon he changed hiB vote in the previous decision. This -.de the vote tive 
to three against, and voided the Legal Tender Act. The three dissenting 
----------------
7 Swisher, 174-5. 
justioes later oommented on the deoision: 
••• these are the taots. We make no 
comment. We do not say that he did not 
agree to the opinion. We only ask ot what 
value was his oonourrenoe. and ot what 
value is the judgment under suoh oiroUDl-
stanoes.8 
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A week later a delegation ot the Court approaohed Grier. who was obvious 
1,. teeble and growing unolear of m.ind. and asked him. to resign. The latter 
at length acquiesoed. to take efteot Februar.y 1. 1810. 
The decision. however. was not made publio yet. waiting on the appoint-
ment and oonfirmation of the new justioes. It is likely that the majority 
hoped to gain the appointment of m.oderate men to the Court. whereas an 
announoement ot the deoision might lead Congress to confirm only an aTowed 
Radical who ~ld uphold the legislation. 
How well the deoision was kept secret is debatable. Noted journals 
such as the.!!!.!2!:! Times and Tribune predicted the act would be upheld. 
9 the latter only a week bet ore the aotual deoision. The !!! ~ World. 
on the other band. said that it was not an inoomplete oourt that cause these 
deoisions to take so long, but tear ot Congress. It cited three oa8es 
specifically, the Cotton Tax Case, the State Test Oath Case. and the Legal 
Tender Case, and said that the Court was willing to "sleep" on them but it 
pushed to a deoision would give adverse opinions in all of them. A:1J:y olam 
of the World to an -inside line" was nullified however. when the Court 
....... ------..... _--
8 Charles Bradley. ed •• :rUsoellaJ1eous Writings of the Late Hon. Joseph P. 
Bradlez:. L. J. Hardball. N .... rk. 1902, 13-4. - - - - -
9 !!! ~ Times, Janua17 4. 1810) !!! ~ Tribune. February 1. 1810. 
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uph&ld the government in the first two oases. 
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'the action of the Court in the oase of Veazie ~ va. Fenno, 8 Wallace 
533, tended to mislead the prognosticators of Hepburn TS. Griswold. This 
c&ae inTolved the right of Congress to tax state bank notes. That body, in 
ora&r to reduce that type of currency, bad put a ten per oent tax on them. 
The banks deolare d this was destructive ta.xation and therefore illegal. The 
Sul1'a.e Court, however, ruled in favor of Congress. It agreed that it was 
at.pe of destructive taxation but asserted that Congress had received the 
right to regulate ourrency from the Constitutien, and, if it wished, could 
~ft immBdiately and oompletely outlawed all forms of state currency. In 
adopting a bank note tax it merely chose an indireot means. 11 
Chief Justioe Chase, in reading the opinion of the Court, had given a 
brOtd construction to the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution. 
and it _s the common assumption that the yet to be announoed Legal Tender 
deolsion would be validated by the same reasoning. 
Congress. in the meanwhile. was acting on the Court vacancies. If the 
"jority of the tribunal hoped for moderate men. they were not encouraged by 
theactions of the legislature. President Grant had nomill&ted his Attorney-
General, Ebenezer Hoar. to fill the newly oreated justioeship. The appoint-
lIepl was well received everywhere but in the Senate. Hoar. notable for his 
bJ'l1iilue and independent manner, had alienated that body on a number of 
.--, ... -------.-_-
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• counts. H. favored oivil servioe, he had opposed impeaohment, and, worst of' 
all. he had played a major part in appointing new circuit judges without 
Senatorial aid or advice. His nomination was not oonfirmed. the avowed 
reason being that the appointment was tor a Southern oirouit and the Senate 
wished a Southerner for the job, although the eventual appointee. Joseph 
Bradley, was also a Northern En. 
While the Senate was discussing the merits of Hoar, Grier's retirement 
plans were announced. It was obvious that the la.tter was not popular with 
the Republicans. but Grant and Congress acted with unfla.ttering haste in 
appointing his eventual suooessor. upOn announoement ot the Justioe's plans 
Congress presented a petition to the President, asking that Edwin M. Stanton 
be appointed to the post. Grant acoeded to their wishes and less than three 
weeks atter Grier's announcem.ent of retirement, Stanton was contirmed by' the 
Senate. 
How this virulent and potent Radioal might have affected the Court .... s 
never discovered, as f'our days atter his appointment Stanton died. The ooun-
try thus witnessed the unique spectacle of the nomination, appointment, and 
12 death of a judge who was to replace one that had not even retired yet. 
In Stanton's place Grant appointed William Strong of' Pennsylvania, a 
circuit judge ot eleven years experience. and considered generally to be 
well qualified. For the new judgeship, he appointed Joseph P. Bradley of 
New Jersey, who elicited mixed comment. Though an eminent and respected 
lawyer, he was without judicial experienoe. Furthermore, his olients, as a 
.. -----.---------
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lawyer, numbwed a few railroads, whose staunch support of the Legal Tender 
lS Act was well known. On the other hand, he had been recommended in Decem-
ber 1869, by no less a personage than Justice Grier, who was even of the 
opposite political party. 
We mention the qualifications of these men particularly for, by an 
unfortunate coincidenoe, the nominations of these two men were sent to Con-
gress the same day that the decision in Hepburn VB. Griswold was handed down. 
While not oritically observed at the time, they were the source of much 
unfavorable oomment at a later period. 
On January 29, 1870 the Supreme Court adopted the final form of the 
opinion in the Hepburn case. It was planned to announoe it on January Slst 
as Grier would still be a member of the Court but owing to a minority request 
for more time to prepare its opinion. the decision was not announced until 
14 February 7, 1870, nearly a week after Grier's retirement. 
It seems more than likely that the minority asked for the postponement 
in order to weaken the foroe of the decision. For although Grier had taken 
part in the proceedings, he was not a member of the Court when the decision 
was handed down. and thus it was deoided by a slim four to three when made 
public. We also know that the minority justices strongly disapproved of the 
value of Grier's vote and, possibly, felt no qualms about neutralizing it. 
The decision, to all intents, invalidated the legal Tender Act. Chase's 
opinion is a rather 100s8 oonglomeration of a number of ideas. In it he 
1S Ewing, 106. 
14 Warren, II, 509-10, 516. 
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stated that th. aot was void on three counts; first. that it exceeded the 
powers of Congress, delegated or implied; seoond, that it violated the spirit 
of the Constitution; and third, that it deprived oreditors of property with-
15 
out due process of law. In disoussing the doctrine of "implied powers", 
Chase did not deny their existence, but qualified their use as dependent on 
"appropriate means. tt Aooording to Chase, it was up to the Court, not Con-
gress, to deoide what means were appropriate, and, in the case of the Legal 
Tender Aot, that means was not SO considered. 
In explaining his own part in the passage of the act, he frankly stateds 
It is not surprising that amid the 
tumult of the late oivil war, and under 
the inf1uenoe of apprehensions for the 
safety of the Republic almost universal, 
different views, never before entertained 
by American statesmen or jurists, were 
adopted by many. The time was not favor-
able to oonsiderate ref1eotion upon the 
oonstitutiona1 limits of Legislative or 
Executive authority. It power was assumed 
trom patriotic motives, the assumption 
found ready justification in patriotic 
hearts. Many who doubted, yielded their 
doubts; many who did not doubt were 
si1ent •••• Not a few who then insisted upon 
its neoessity, or aoquiesoed in that view, 
have, since the return of peaoe, and under 
the influence of the calmer time, recon-
sidered their conc1usion.16 
Chase further attempted to justify invalidation of the aot by attempting 
to prove that the paper currency provided for by it was not essential to the 
winning of the war. Be oited examples of other paper money that were not 
legal tender, oirculating freely through the war without depreciating in 
---------------
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value. It paper currenoy oould so oiroulate without benefit of Congress-
ional approval, then the Legal Tender Aot was not essential. If not essen-
tial, it could not be oonsidered as a justifiable war power. 
This point must have been argued among the justioes themselves, as 
Justioe Miller's dissent oovers the same ground. In the minority opinion~ 
he defends the essential nature of the greenbaoks. Without the law. they 
and the other paper money might well have depreciated oonsiderably, but 
"when by law they were made to discharge the funotion of paying debts, they 
had a perpetual oredit or value, equal to the amount of all debts, public or 
private, in the oountry.n17 Generally, the tone of the minority opinion was 
that the Supreme Court was taking too much on itself when it undertook to 
tell Congress what legislative means were necessary and proper. 
Theoretioally, the deoision only applied to contracts prior to passage 
of the aot. The first reaction, then, was only slight interest. The 
Independent stated~ "This decision is of much less consequence than it would 
have been if it had been rendered five years sooner. In 1870, it is not a 
means ot proteotion or redress, but only a message of condolence." The 
washington Chronicle averred that confidence in the greenback was too great 
to be shaken by any such judicial decision.18 Most of the press seemed to 
assume that the deoision had no effect on the validity of the act for other 
than prior contracts, and further assumed that no such decision would be made 
-----------~---
17 Swisher, 178-9. 
18 Independent~ February 10~ 1870, Washington Chronicle~ February 12, 1870; 
cited in Warren. II, 513. 
1 
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• There were some, however, who realized that the position taken by the 
Court applied to all contracts equally, whether prior to or after passage 
of the aot. The deoision had not stressed the prior nature of the oontract 
involved in this case, but had discussed a body of prinoiples applicable in 
any case. The Boston Advertiser promptly acoused the Court of studying the 
effects of this deoision before taking the "final plunge" and declaring the 
whole act unoonstitutiona1 in all its aspects, and that they, for one, did 
not care to stand meekly by while the Supreme Court experimented with the 
19 laws of ourrency. Nor did Congress apparently. Two days after the deois-
ion, Senator Wilson introduoed a bill that would inorease the membership of 
the Court to ten and insure a healthier regard for the greenbaoks in the 
Court.20 
As the significanoe ot the deoision dawned on the oountry, demands for 
a re-hearing immediately began. These demands, however, orystallized publio 
opinion on paper money and strong foroes appeared on both sides. ~avoring 
the action of the Court were the banks and oreditor olasses in general for 
whom the Legal Tender .lot .... s "legalized cheating." Among the more intel-
lectual groups there was also agreement with the Court for preventing the 
continuanoe of an unsound eoonomio system. 
On the other side was a muoh vaster group, or. as Miller put it in hi. 
opinion. the masses to whom the greenbaok ..... an "economic panacea." Strong 
disapproval was voiced by the farmers, the railroads, munioipalities with 
---------_ ... _ .. .., 
19. Boston Daily Advertiser, February 9, 1870. 
20 Swisher, 181. 
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heavy bonded indebtedness, and debtor groups of all types.2l • 
The Nation, one of the few leading periodicals to side with the Court, 
claiRed that the commotion against the decision was not the result of the 
opposition of the people in general, but was motivated through the etfort. 
of moneyed corporations who wished to eBoape their burden of debt. It un-
equivocally stated, "So far as the public is concerned, there has not been a 
breath of popular di8content to justify any political movement."22 Wbile 
this may have been true to some extent, it is a fact that public opinion 
moves slowly. The groups that favored greenbaoks atill possessed them, and, 
unaware of the niceties of constitutional law, may easIly have assumed they 
would continue to possess them. There would probably have been no great 
public turore until a court decision forced Congress to begin contracting the 
currency. 
The iation, nevertheless, did present the best and soundest argument 
against the paper currency. To that medium it ascribed the "prevailing lax-. 
ity of commercial morals" and blamed it for the spirit of speculation then 
rife throughout the country. While there were other tactors involved. that 
view 1I8.S undoubtedly sound as far as it went. The country was embroiled in 
an "easy .oney" .cono~ that was to culminate in a number of financial 
23 
scandals that could originally be traced to the advent of paper money. 
Four days after the confirmation of the new justices, and the day after 
Bradley took his seat, Attomey-General Hoar asked that two pending Legal 
_ .._------------
21 Warren, II, 499. 
22 Nation, March 24. 1870. 
23 Ibid., Februa 10 1869. 
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Tender Cases be taken up in spite of the previous deoision. on the g~ounds 
that they involved oontraots made after the passage of the aot.24 This 
oreated a mild sensation tor even opponents otBepburn va. Griswold oonsid-
ered it as settling the Legal Tender Cases. What proved to be even more 
surprising was the announoement of the Court on April 1. 1870 that it would 
hear the oases in question. The Court had split fi~ to four on reoonsid-
eration. Chase. Nelson. Clifford. and Field dissenting. It was the same 
grouping that bad deoided Hepburn vs. Griswold with Strong and Bradley added 
to the previous minority. Chase deolared that the reoonsideration was in 
violation ot a oourt rule that no oases. previously decided. should be heard 
again unless the justioes who formed the majority should agree to a rehear-
25 ing. Justice Strong, speaking tor the majority, stressed the derangement 
ot national economy as well as the inherent rights of Congress as being 
important enough in these oases to warrant further consideration. The tone 
of Strong's remarks was suoh that the 'previous decision was practically 
26 
reversed in the rehearing opinion itselt. 
The continuance of legal tender as a judicial problem oame as a surprise 
to the country. partiou1ar1y as the supposedly tina1 decision had been given 
only two months previous. In spite of publio support of paper currency. the 
new turn of events 1I&.S not viewed .... ith c01ll.plete tavor. It came as a shook to 
see the Supreme Court vaoillate so easily and reject so quickly one of its 
24 Latba:mvs.!!.:!:... DeminG va. !:!:.. 9 Wallaoe 146. 
26 Swisher. 182-3. 
26 Warren, II, 520. 
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awn solemn deci~ions, even if the decision might be untenable. Harpers 
Weekly, although admitting that the action of the Court might have merit, 
27 
upbraided that body for its lack of caution in taking said aotion. It was 
felt by many that the Court acted too quiokly in granting opportunities for 
a possible reversal. The greenbacks were in no immediate danger; in fact, 
many believed them to be unaffected by Hepburn va. GriBWold • 
. 
The greatest calamity, thought the Nation, was the loss of popular res-
pect for the Court, and, as a result, refusal by parties affected to be bound 
28 
by Court decision. Coming at the end of a particularly difficult era for 
the Court as it was, it was certain to be partioular1y harmful to the tribu-
na1's prestige. Warren states that 
Whatever may have been the popular 
view in 1870, there is no doubt that ever 
sinoe that era the Court's action in 
reopening its first deoision has been 
regarded as a very grave mistake--and a 
mistake which for many years impaired the 
people's confidence, not in the honesty, 
but in the impartiality and good sense of 
the Court.29 
The Latham and Deming cases were heard in an atmosphere of judicial 
strife. During the hearing the question came up as to whether an agreement 
had been made after the Hepburn case, binding all pending cases to the 
deoision of that one. Attorney-General Hoar denied that his predecessor had 
ever been aware of suoh an order. Chase recollected that suoh an agreement 
27 Harpers Weekly, New York, April 16, 1870. 
28 Nation, April 7, 1870. 
29 Warren, II, 522. 
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had been made~hich Justice Miller promptly denied. Nelson then concurred 
with Chase but Davis sided with Miller, after which Chase very heatedly 
reaffirmed the point. As this took place in open court, it was widely 
reported and gave rise to numerous discussions as to whether an agreement 
30 
was or was not made. 
The five justices who favored h~aring the Latham and Deming cases 
strongly denied any explicit agreement, saying: 
We do not doubt that oounsel for 
appellants and counsel for the United 
States believed ••• that the judgment of 
the Supreme Court in Hepburn vs. Griswold 
and other legal tender cases argued at 
the same time, would establish principles 
on that subject that would govern the 
cases now under oonsideration, and all 
other oases in whioh the same questions 
might arise. 
This understanding was no more than 
the expeotation, usual and generally well 
founded, that a prinoiple decided by this 
Court will govern all oases falling with-
in it. But this expectation must be sub .. 
ordinated to the possibility, fortunately 
rare; that the Court may reconsider the 
questions so deoided; and confers no 
absolute right.3l 
In addition, they took partioular exception to the fact that Chase made 
suoh a statement at all, as it invaded nthe sanctity of the conferenoe roomn, 
as well as being without substance. 
Aooording to the majority, after Hepburn vs. Griswold was heard, the 
counsel for Latham moved for an early hearing of his case. Chase was about 
30 Boston Daily Advertiser, April 12, 1870. 
31 Bradley, 66. 
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• to grant this when Miller asked the Chief Justice to take it into conterence. 
There Miller asked that the hearing be postponed until the two pending 
appointments to the Court were _de. Chase agreed to this, although stating 
that as far as he was concerned, the legal tender issue was settled. Noth-
ing, however, was said to the effect that the Legal Tender Act could not be 
argued again. It was pointed out that if there had been any commi:baent made, 
there would have been no reason to postpone the Latham case for a tull Court 
32 
as nothing could have been done anyway. 
As it happened, nothing came of the hearing. Counsel for Latbam and 
Deming moved for dismissal of their appeals and were SO granted by the Court 
33 
on April 18th. Although Radical Republicans and greenback men continued 
to clamor for turther action, the bulk of the country was relieved by what 
seemed to be tinal and definite action. The American Law Review considered 
dismissal the only reasonable move, stating that so many minor courts, 
adhering to the previous decision, bas ruled out great numbers of cases, 
that it would be jUdicially upsetting as well as judicially embarrassing it 
a reversal were banded down.34 
Within two weeks, however, the Court had raised the problem again by 
ordering a rehearing of ~ vs. k!!, 12 Wallace 451, which had been argued 
the previous November. The reargument 1I8.S not schedu led until the next term 
and 1I8.S heard on February 23, 1811. The case primarily involved a confisca-
tion law passed by one of the Confederate states and whether such a law 
...... --------_ ... 
32 Ibid., 69-70. 
-33 Warren, II, 523. 
34 American Law Review, April 18, 1810. 
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could be considered a legitimate exeroise of war power. The Legal Tender 
Aot, oited as an example of this power, was tacitly admitted to be valid, 
insofar as this case was oonoerned, by both oounsel, and so did not beoome a 
point of iasue. At the olose ot the argument, however, Clarkson Potter, 
oounsel for the plaintiff, asked to be heard on the oonstitutional question. 
Another reargument was therefore ordered for the 18th of April. On that day 
and the following one arguments were heard, and on May 1, 1871, fifteen 
months after Hepburn va. Griswold, the ruling on the Legal Tender .lot was 
35 
reversed, and the aot was upheld in the broadest possible manner. 
Justioe Strong's majority opinion was somewhat vague in oharaoter. .ls 
with the deoisions regarding the Reoonstruotion .lots, the emphasis was plaoed 
on results rather than legal interpretation, the majority frankly admitting 
that "the oourt cannot disregard eoonomio realities.n36 The legal basis for 
the reversal was the aggregation of a number of constitutional clauses to 
validate a partioular power. It was stated that implied power ..... may be 
deduoed fairly from more than one of the substantive powers expressly defined 
or from all ot them combined. It is permissible to group together any number 
of them and inter from them all that the power claimed has been oonferred.w37 
The legality of the Legal Tender Act was thus deduced from the power to ooin 
money and the power to wage war. 
While we may deory the methods used by the Supreme Court we can hardly 
35 Warren, II, 524. 
36 Alfange, 84. 
37 Cushman, 223-4. 
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• blame that body for its aotion. Although the phrase "eoonomio realities" 
often looks weak when brought faoe to faoe with the oold reasoning of oon-
stitutional law_ it was decidedly the more powerful in this case. Greenbacks 
were a reality, not to a few, but to a whole nation. 
Congress must shoulder part of the blame for the Court' 8 aotion. The 
act in question was passed as a war measure only. When peace was restored 
it was the duty of the legislative branch to perform the neoessary funotion 
ot repealing it_ or else validate it as a peaoetime law. It was oertainly 
not the plaoe ot the Supreme Court to manipulate the finanoial struoture of 
the oountry. As Harpers Weekly stated_ "It is a great error to suppose that 
we oan with safety rely upon a oourt to e.mpl~ a legislative funotion and 
38 
restore the oountry to speoie payments. As a oonsequence ot assuming said 
legislative funotion_ the Court was forced to deoide the validity of the law 
on its finanoial rather than legal and judioial merits_ and a somewhat 
"unjudioial" opinion could well be expeoted. 
The general feeling generated by the opinion was that the Court had not 
helped itself as tar as prestige was ooncerned. Even Justioe's Strong's 
detense ot the decision on the grounds that the previous decision had only 
been deoided ~ a majority ot tour was not enough to quiet all reproaoh. It 
is ironio that_ while apparently conforming to the will of the majority_ the 
Court should sutfer a 108s of prestige trom that same majority_ The criti-
cima of the Court for Knox vs. Lee gives rise to the question of whether 
- -
the demand for paper money was as strong among the people as the Radioa.l 
Republioans and various pressure groups made it out to be. Certainly the 
------------.... -
38 Harpers WeekI _ April 16_ 1870. 
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• Court was remembered, for a long period, more for the tact of reversal than 
for what was involved in the reversal. 
Those who opposed the Legal Tender Act on its own merits were more 
vociferous in their criticisa, particularly ot the two new justices. It was 
felt that neither Strong nor Bradley should bave participated in the deoision 
particularly in view of their previous connections with agencies that favored 
39 
retention ot the Legal Tender Act. Bradley was the target ot the most 
abuse. It was noted that the Camden and .Amboy Railroad, which had retained 
Bradley prior to his appointment, had agreed to pay in gcld, interest due on 
bonds, but had made a reservation on future payments, looking toward a pos-
sible reversal of Hepburn vs. Griswold. Dissemination ot information such 
as this immediately led to the charge that the Court was paoked. 
This oharge has been made quite regularly ever sinoe the deoision and 
has been the source of much controversy. In the light of what is known now 
the charge seems to have been unfounded. Obviously President Grant and the 
Radicals tavored retention ot the greenbacks and, if they had the opportun· 
ity, and there was a necessity for it, they would probably have made the 
attempt to fix the Court. The attempt by Senator Wilson to add a tenth jus ... 
tice to the Court after the first Legal Tender deoision reflects this atti-
tude, but it also reflected an uncertainty on the J:*rt of the Radicals. It 
a reversal were assured in their minds by the appointment of Strong and 
Bradley, there would have been no need for Wilson's bill. 
Whether the Court was packed or not seems to hinge largely on how well 
----------.----
39 !!! ~ Tribune, May 1, 1871. !!! ~ World, May 3, 1871. 
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the Hepburn vs. Griswold decision was kept secret between the time 01 its 
adoption on November 27. 1869. and its eventual ]?I1blication on February 7. 
1870. It was during this period that the new justices were added and. con-
ceivably, the period ,in whioh the Court could have been packed. 
Everybody seems to have tried to find out what the Court deoided but 
very few admit to having found out. Those newspapers who claimed to have the 
deoision figured out were more often wrong than right. In fact. the more 
responsible publications almost universally predicted the outoome incor-
rectly--one indication that the secret was well kept. 
Whether ~ leak came trom the justices themselves is possible. but 
doubtful. There has never been a hht of such an occurrenoe in al11 Court 
case. and no accusations were _de during this period that suoh might be the 
case. EVen in the vitriolic counter charges made by Chase on one hand. and 
Swayne. Miller. and Davil on the other concerning the justice of rehearing 
the first case. nothing was said on either side to the etfect that the decis-
ion might have been known before its publioation. 
The only person who has admitted knowing anything ot the deoisicn before 
its release was George Boutwell. then Secretary ot the Treasury. He states 
that Chase informed him. of the decision two weeks in advance because the 1at-
ter teared it would bring serious financial disturbanoe and wished Boutwell 
to be prepared. Whether this gave Boutwell time enough to "tix" the appoint-
ments ot Bradley and Strong is debatable. Chase apparently thought it did 
for Boutwell says the former berated him after the Knox vs. Lee deoision tor 
-
allOWing two justioes to be added to the Court to overrule a previous 
40 deoision. 
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If Chase told Boutwell of the bBpending deoision he must have as~ed 
that the latter was. at the worst. indifferent as to the result. It would 
have shown. great naivete on the part of the Chief Justioe to tell an avowed 
Radioal like Boutwell of the deoision. and not expect reperoussions. What-
ever the Seoretary's viewa. it is doubtful whether he bad any effeot on the 
appointments. Chase' 8 revelation must have taken plaoe near the end of Janu-
ary and by that time. the appointments 8eem to have been unofficially 
decided. On that latter subjeot, Senator Roar states: 
The deoision of the Supreme Court in 
Hepburn va. Griswold 1II8.S made and entered 
when the judges had finished reading their 
opinions on Monday, February 7th, 1870, 
after the nominations of Justice Strong and 
Bradley had been laid upon the table of the 
Senate. It was some hours after they had 
been signed b,y the President. It was some 
days after they bad been agreed on in 
Cabinet meeting. It was weeks after the 
prcbable appointment of Judge Strong ••• 
had been announoed in the newspapers •••• 41 
It will be remembered also that Bradley had been suggested for the vacanoy 
as early as Deoember 1869. As a matter of fact, Bradley's reoeption by Con-
gress was somewhat lukewarm and, although a Repablican. his most flattering 
praise came from the Democratic !!!: ~ World whioh stated: 
---------------
••• the Demooratio Senators, have, 
from the first, hailed the nomination of 
Mr. Bradley as that of one 80 respeotable 
40 George Sewall Boutwell. Reminisoenoes 2! Sixty Years .!! Public Ufairs, 
MoClure Phillips & Co., New York, 1902, 209-10. 
41 Senator George F. Roar to the Worcester !El, Deoember 12, 1896, oited in 
Bradley, 51. 
and wort~, though a Reptlblican, that the 
wonder grew hOW" Grant ever oame to piok 
him out •••• lfe oonfidently look to him and 
to Judge Strong a8 aotiTe allies with the 
Chief Justioe and his conservatiTe breth-
ren •••• 42 
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With oredentials suoh as these it seems that Grant oould have pioked a more 
innoouous prospeot if he wished to oontrol the Court. 
The President. particularly. has been assailed for his part in the 
alleged paoking. It is true that he made the appointments but the record 
points to him a8 less/ involved in some respeots than Congress. Grant's first 
appointment, that of .A.ttorneyooGeneral Hoar. was hailed as the nomination of 
a moderate, oonservatiTe man; a type that would have been weloomed b.1 the 
majority of the Court. Hoar was, however. rejeoted by Congress, and the 
next appointment was made as a regult of a petition by Congress to the Pr8si-
dent; that of Edwin X. Stanton, of whom it is muoh more likely to believe aa 
being appointed to serve a epeoial interest. No doubt Grant favored reten-
tion of the Legal!ender .lot and would oertainly not appoint anyone to the 
Suprem.e Court who was openly against it, but the oharaoter of his appoint-
menta as well as the time element refute any oharge levelled at him. 
Finally, it would have been difficult for the President to appoint any 
outstanding jurist to the benoh who did not favor the Legal Tender .lot. S1%-
teen lesser oourts had ruled on legal tender cases and fifteen of them had 
43 
upheld the law. Such ananimdty of opinion also militates against the oourt 
-_ .. -------_ .. ---
42 Bew York World. lfarob 3. 1810. 
--
43 Sohuokers, 258. 
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paoking oharge. • On the basis of this overwhelming evidenoe the oountry oould 
reasonably expeot the Court to do likewise. 
After Knox vs. Lee the issue was settled and paper money became an 
- -
accepted part of our financial structure. The following year the Court 
banded down a deoision in Trebilcook va. Wilson, 79 U.S. 607, stating that 
oontl"a.ots demanding payment in specie oould not be enforoed. Twelve years 
later in the case of Juilliard vs. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, the issuanoe of 
paper money was sweepingly upheld as a peacetime as well as wartime power 
44 
of Congress. 
-----------....... 
44 Swisher, 195. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COURT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDI4EN'l' 
The prooess of Reconstruotion did not oonfine itself to politioal 
rights alone. In the wake of the Civil War there came a rash of legislation 
dealing with federal and state relations~ partioularly in the field of civil 
rights. Of all the results of the Civil War and Reconstruction this type of 
legislation was to have the most profound and lasting affect. The political 
phases of Reconstruction had embittered the South but they passed after 18'76 
and~ except for the more unregenerate, became merely unhappy memories. The 
new order involving civil rights, however, was not to pass as easily, bat 
was to beoome an integral part of the national acene. 
The bads of the change was the termination of slavery. Under the 
existing struoture of the Constitution, there was no provision for suoh an 
eventuality' so thr.e new amendments to that dllowaent .... re speedily passed by 
the Radical Congress, the first in over sixty years. These amendments, the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth, were designed to help the "freedman" 
assume a place in society, and were to guarantee that his place alongside 
the other citizens would be respected. Roughly detined, these three amend-
ments freed the slave, made him. a citizen, and gave him the right to vote. 
The Thirteenth and Fifteenth .Amendments~ passed in 1865 and 18'70 res-
pectively, afforded little cantrover~. They were short, concise, and 
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self-explanatory. Though they might not be popular in the South. at least 
they were easily understood. 
The Fourteenth Amendment. however. oonsisted of four lengtbr seotions. 
whose interpretations were to be the souroe of ~terDlinab1e debate. In 
point of faot, there have been more oases involving this amendment than 8llT 
other phase of oonstitutiona1 law, sinoe its passage in 1868. 
Seotion One of the amendment conferred oitizenship on all native born 
or naturalized oitizens. Seotion Two explained how representation in Con-
gress shall be oaloulated. with the admonition that if any oitizens were 
denied their right to vote said representation would be reduoed in proportion 
to the number SO denied. Seotion Three prohibited from Federal servioe 8llT 
ex-Contederates who had previously held positions of importanoe in the govern 
mant prior to the war; and Seotion Four repudiated the debt oontraoted by the 
states in rebellion. 
The first seotion was to prove the tooal point ot the amendment. It 
read, 
.. -............ _-----
All persons born or naturalized in the· 
United States. and subjeot to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are oitizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. 
Bo state shall make or enforoe ~ law whioh 
shall abridge the privileges or ~ities 
ot oitizens of the United Stat •• , nor shall 
any state deprive ~ person of lite. liberty. 
or property. without due prooess of law; nor 
de~ to any person within its jurisdiotion the 
equal proteotion of the laws. l 
1 Constitution!!. ~ United States, Amendment XIV, Seotion 1. 
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This was the first mention ot rights ot oithens ot the United states 
over and above their rights as citizens of a particular state. Whether these 
national rights were superior to, ooneurrent with, or interior to state 
oitizenship rights remained to be seen. 
The first ea.e that was to lave any bearing on the subjeot was the 
previously mentioned ease of Texas va. White. Prillarily a decision involving 
Reoonstruotion, it defined the legal status of the rebellious atates, and 
ruled that they had never lett the Union. Chase t s opinion, however, was 
built on the thesis that the national government had as DIllC,h right to olaim 
priority of existence as the states and, as a oonsequence, added substanoe to 
the undeveloped words of the amendment. 
As a result of the doctrhe fC"ODlUlgated in Texas vs. White, with ita 
basis in the Fourteenth Amendment, it seemed that a oitizen oould appeal to 
the national governmeDt for proteotion ot his rights although they were ex-
pressly protected by the individual states. 
A political idea so startling in nature, with its obvious rejeotion of 
state guaranty of civil rights, oould only have entered the American soene 
through a oonstitutional araendment. No court in the land, in its most 
national moments, would have ruled favorably on such a theory. AS a matter 
of fact, even in the form of a constitutional amendment, it was questioned. 
At the time ot the passage ot the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Chase 
wrote to Justioe Field, stating that he oonsidered the amendment too broad in 
soope, and particularly disapproved of the clauses r.~rding disfranchisement 
and national guaranty ot oivil rights.2 
_ ..------.. -_ ......... 
2 Milton, 315. 
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Five years elapsed, howeTer, before the Fourteenth .blendment ... 1 fully 
interpreted. It ca.me before the Supreme Court in the famous Slaughterhouse 
Case8, 16 Wallaoe 36. The ca.se oame about through the "carpetbag" govermaent 
of Louisiana. That body of worthie8 had set up a slaughterhouse monopoly in 
New Orleans by granting privileges to one picked oom.pany, to the exolusion of 
all others. The latter, with their livelihood taken away, a8ked relief frOB 
the Supreme Court on the grounds that they were deprived of their rights unde 
the Fourteenth .A:m.endment without due prooess of law. 3 
The ca.se was originally set down in 1870 but _s not argued until 
January 1872. However, at the tim of the argument Justioe Nelson was absent 
and, as the Court bad divided equally, a reargument 118.8 ordered for February 
1873.4 
The proble. oonfronting the Court wa8 to deoide what this new national 
citizen8hip entailed, and how far it could legally go. The amendment was 
most obviously instituted for the protection of the freedman against un-
friendly state governments who might ourtail his civil rights. There were 
other possibilities, hOW8Ter. One author has oredited the insertion of the 
"due prooess" olause in the am.endment to Representative J olm A. Bingham, an 
influential railroad lawyer, who was thinking of corporations as the "person" 
1nvolved.5 Ten years later, in the hearing of !.2 Mateo £l. va. Southern 
--.. -~------- .. --
3 Cushman, 40-2. 
4 Warren, II, 635-6. 
5 W. E. Woodward, !!!! American History, Garden City Publishing Co., New 
York, 1938, 594. 
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Railroad Co •• 116 U.S. 138. Rosooe Conkling, a former ~ber of the Committee 
on Reconstruction tlBt had drafted the amendment, appeared and presented the 
proceedings of that committee. These purported to show that the amendment 
was not intended for the exolusive protection of the freedman, but was to 
protect ftvestedft as well as civil rights. 
As to how far the f~ers of the amendment intended to go, one author 
haa stated: 
There seems no doubt that as a 
matter of historical tact the fra-
mers of the amendment meant by 
'privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States' the whole body 
of ordinary civil rights and especially 
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights 
of the federal Constitution. They in-
tended to place in the hands of Congress 
the broadest possible power to prevent 
the impairment of these rights •••• 
Instead ot looking to the state legis-
lature for legislative protection of his 
civil liberty, the citizen ••• wou1d hence-
forth look to Congress or to the Federal 
Courts.6 
Congress proposed but the Court disposed. On April 14, 1873, it 
rendered a verdiot upholding the government of Louisiana and ruled that the 
slaughterhouse monopoly did not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The deoision was handed down on a five to four vote, Killer, 
Davis, Strong, Clifford, and ward Hunt oomprising the majority, the latter 
having succeeded Nelson early that year. It is very doubtful whether the 
vote would have been different if Nelson had not died. The majority opinion 
was a oheok on Congressional power and oentralization of government. both of 
which Nelson had oonsistently voted against. 
6 Cushman, 41. 
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The division of the Court on the deoision is interesting" howev3r. !he 
previous alignments were oonsiderably upset. The deoision was oertainly oon-
servative in tendena,y" rejeoting the extension of the idea of nationalism 
which had pervaded the whole Reoonstruotion period, yet three of the five 
justioes who made up the majority, Davis" Miller, and Strong, had generall)" 
aooepted the Congressional program. In oontrast, of the minority of Chase, 
Field, Swayne, and Bradley, the first two named were usually opposed to an)" 
form. of extension of national power such as was upheld in the minority 
opinion. 
In giving the deoision, the Court arbitrarily deoided that the Fourteentb 
Amendment was not intended to bring the domain of civil rights, heretofore 
belonging exclusively to the states, under the jurisdiotion of the national 
govermnent, nor did the amendment antioipate the Court as a "perpetual 
censor" of state aotivities. As far as the slaughterhouse monopoly was con-
eerned, it was a legitimate exercise of state police power. 
Warren calls Miller's majority opinion "one of the gloriOUS landmarks of 
American la .... "7 In one sense he is oorrect. It is possible that, but for 
the decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, our government would be muoh more 
oentralized than it is today, and when we realize how far the centralizing 
tendenoy has gone in spite ot such a decision, we can visualize what it might 
have been had not such a deoision been given. On the other hand" if we con-
aider a "landmark" to be a notable and reasonably absolute prinoiple of law 
formulated and presented, Miller's opinion taIls tar short. Certainly his 
oomments on "due prooess" no longer state the law as it exists tOday.8 
.. _ ..... -----------
7 Warren, II, 546. 
8 Cushman 41 
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It was Miller's oontention that the new and exalted category of·citizen 
'of the United states" was not as superior as 1I&S olaimed. He pointed out 
that anyone under the jurisdiotion of the United States can be a citizen of 
the United States whereas to be a citizen of a state a person had to be a 
resident of said state. This, he claimed, was a taoit admission that there 
were two kinds of oitizenshi~. If there were two different types of oitizen-
ship, the privileges and immunities of each mast also be different. 
He then takes the phrase, "No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 
Because the words "citizen of the United States" appear instead of "oitizen 
of the state,· he reasons that the provision is not attempting to protect the 
citizen against his own state insofar as state oitizenship privileges and 
immunities are ooncerned, but only as far as national citizenship privileges 
and immunities are concerned. Thus the latter type, whatever they were, 
would be the only ones protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
He then prooeeded to view the oonsequences resulting fraa an opposite 
decision, admitting that although an argument of this type is not the most 
oonclusive, when 
••• These consequences are so serious, 
so far reaching and pervading, so great a 
departure fra. the structure and the spirit 
of our institutions I when the effect is to 
fetter and degrade the state governments by 
subjecting them to the ccntrol of Congress, 
in the exercise of powers heretofore 
universally oonoeded to them of the most 
ordinary and fundamental oharaoter J when in 
faot it radioal17 ohanges the whole theory of 
the relations of the state and federal govern-
ments to eaoh other and of both these govern-
ments to the people; the argument has a foroe 
that is irresistable in the absenoe of 
language which expresses 8uoh a purpose 
too olearl~ to admit of doubt.9 
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The opinion of the _jority in this case was tantamount to rejection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court could not declare it unconstitutional a8 
it 118.8 now ~rt of the Constitution6 but it could and did interpret the 
amendment in suoh a manner that its effeot would be nullified. Wbat importan1 
rights were left to a citizen of the United States when those in the Bill of 
Rights were excluded? The Court had ruled that those were to be protected. 
solely by the statea. In the case of the freedman particularlY6 praotically 
ever,y guarantee that he was in danger of losing was enumerated in the first 
ten amendments6 foroing ht. to appeal to a hostile state for protection6 and 
neutralizing the prime purpose of the law. 
These were the sentiments of the minori~ justioes who called the 
deoision a "vain and idle enaotment acoomplishing nothing." Justice SwaJne 
in delivering the dissenting Opinion6 said in part: 
By the Constitution6 as it stood 
before the war6 ample proteotion was 
given against oppression by the Union, 
but little was given against wrong and 
oppression by the States. That want .... s 
intended to be supplied by this Amend-
ment. Against the former thd.s Court haa 
been oalled upon more than onoe to inter-
pose. Authority of the same 8.1Ilplltude 
was intended to be conferred as to the 
latter. But this arm of our jurisdiction 
is, in these cases, strioken down by the 
judgment just given.10 
Critioism of the deoision was confined ohiefly to the Radical 
Republicana 6 however, who olaimed that their effort. were twisted and dis-
----.. -_ .. _-_ .. _--
9 .!!?!!., 44-6. 
10 Warren. II. 538-9. 
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toned beyond all hope ot successtul application. The pre~s. in genlral. was 
favorable. Nation expresled pleasure that the Court was finally reoovering 
from -1I8.r tever," and re-a.sserting itsindependenoe.ll The!!! ~ World 
applauded the deoision. regretting only that it had not been stated more 
strongly. 12 The only complaints were that. in spite of' the justice of' the 
principle. the decision allowed monopolies a dangerous amount ot freedom, 
giving. as the Cincinnati Inquirer stated, " ••• legal sanotion to theoonsum-
mation ot an outrage on individual rights that is almost unparralleled ... 13 
The generally favorable reception of' the decision seems somewhat It range 
today. It must be remanbered. however. that the large oorporations had 
bardly _de themselves felt in 1873, and tear of' monopoly was not too 
prevalent. It seemed more im.portant to the oountry that state police power 
be protected than that potential monopoly be cheoked. Then too, there was a 
natural reaotion bound to set in atter the excesses of the Radical Congresses. 
For many people. even staunch Union men, nationalism had grown too quickly, 
and they were happy to see an assault on state powers repelled. 
In any case. it was certainly a reversal of the previous trend. But for 
the deoision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the theory ot state's rights would 
have been interred with the Civil War. As it 118.8. it was not until the 
decade ot the "eighties" that the issue p6rl11anently ceased to be a major 
faotor in American life. 
For the states themselves. the deoision 118.8 a bonanza. They were to use 
the polioe power deduced from it to oontrol the growing strength ot the large 
---...... ---------11 Nation, April 24. 1873. 
12 !2 ~ -.W..-or;.;;l;.;;.d, April 16, 1873. 
13 Cinoinnati In uirer. April 16. 1873; cited in Warren, II, 540. 
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corporations. Within fifteen years, however, the position of the cottrt on 
police power was to prove untenable when confronted with the mushrooming 01' 
vast interstate commercial interests. 
Although state polioe power was thus limited, the narrow interpreta.tion 
of citizenship rights was to remain for a much longer period. As late as 
1900 the Court still held that privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States do not include the rights contained in the first eight amend .. 
ments to the Constitution, and as late as 1940 that decision was still the 
rule of the Court.14 
The only group that did not gain by the decision in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases was the freedmen for whom the Fourteenth Amendment had originally been 
written. Later attempts by Congress to restore some virility to the amend-
ment were emasculated by the promulgation by the Supreme Court of the 
doctrine that the Federal government could not proteot the citizens from each 
other but only trom discriminator.y state legislation.15 Also, this protectio 
was not to extend to social but only to civil rights. In the Slaughterhouse 
Cases the Court decided that as the Fourteenth Amendment had grown. out ot the 
Negro question, it should be interpreted as dealing almost solely with that 
problem. However. in spite of this seemingly favorable ruling, the 
direction ot this interpretation was toward limiting and restricting the 
protection offered in the amendment. Furthermore, this view 01' the amendment 
taken by the Court is in direct opposition to the interpretation :r;reva.lent 
today which recognizes the amendment as a broad base tor all state, civil, 
and property rights. 
--_ ... -............. _-
14 Maxwell vs. ~. 176 U.S. 581, Cushman, 41-2. 
15 Morison & Comma er 51-2. 
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The case and its aftel"llB.th present a very strange picture. The" 
Fourteenth Amendment Was passed for one purpose; to transfer the immunities 
• 
in the Bill of Rights to the jurisdiotion ot the Federal government. When 
the test case comes up it is tried, not on the obvious purpose of the amend-
ment, but on the side issue ot state police power; and without ever hearing a 
case involving citizenship immunities, the Court oonoludes an interpretation 
on those immunities differing completely fran that of the tramers of the 
amendment. The ruling on the side issue, on which the case was tried, 
vanishes in a decade. The ruling on the min, on which the case 1I&S not 
tried, persists for three quarters ot a cemtury • 
.As late as 1908, the decision was detended by the Supreme Court. In 
Twining vs. !!! Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, Justice :Moody lauded the ruling in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases, stating: 
••• if the views of the minority 
bad prevailed, it is easy to see 
how far the authority and inde-
pendence of the States would have 
been diminished, by subjecting all 
their legislative and judicial acts 
to oorrection by the legislative and 
review by the judicial branch of the 
National government.lS 
On the other mnd, the opinion remains that the Court, by that deoision, 
threw out notable gains in civil liberties that are still slowly and 
arduously being won baok. It is olaimed that had the Fourteenth Amendment 
been interpreted as it had been written, the nation would be much more 
advanoe,d in the sphere of oivil rights. Professor Burgess, writing in 1890, 
spoke critically of the deoision: 
--.-.... -.. _------
16 Warren, II, 547. 
Coming at the time when the reaotion 
bad begun to let in against the pronounoed 
Nationalism of the preoeding decade, it 
partook of the same, and set the direction 
towards the restoration of that particular-
ism in the domain of civil liberty, from whioh 
we suffered 10 severely before 1861, and from. 
which we are again sutfering now.17 
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While possibly not a landmark in the sense that Protessor Warren meant, 
the Slaughterhouse Cases are certainly a beacon in the history of the Supreme 
Court. They ruled upon a major amendment to the Alneriean Constitution, an 
important action in itself. In making that ruling they reversed a pronounoed 
and powerful national trend and made a protound impression on state and 
federal relations. Finally. the decision restored to the Supreme Court a 
judicial independence that bad been wanting in the poevious decade, and 
opened the way for eventual reo1amation of the tribunal's former prestige. 
The Slaughterhouse Cases were the first of the post-Civi1 War oases that 
rebuilt the Court into a tormidab1e and authoritative branoh of the Federal 
government. 
---------------
17 John W. Burgess. Political Soienoe and Constitutional Law, I, 228-30J 
- -cited in Warren, II, 548. 
CBAPl'ER V 
THE RESTORATION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The decision in the Slaughterhouse Oases was both the climax and the 
turning point in the Court's struggle to regain its tormer position ot 
authority in the American IOene. Although it was not to succeed completely 
until the Radical Republicans lost control ot Congress. that body. atter 
1870, leaned more and more toward conservative construotion ot the legal 
changes wrought in the previous decade. As has been stated, a reaction was 
setting in against the nationalistic spirit and the Court used it to its 
fullest extent. 
In the same year as the Slaughterhouse deoision, the case ot ~ VB. 
Lockhart, 17 Wallace 570, was heard. involving legislative acts of the 
various states ot the Confederacy. In 1870 the Court had ruled that the 
Confederacy was merely an "armed resistance to the righttul authority of the 
sovereign," and that its acts were invalid insofar as they aided said re-
sistance.l In ~ vs. Lockhart. however, the Court modified its previous 
ruling, stating that the acts of the several Confederate states, "so tar as 
they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the National authority 
or the just rights of the oitizens under the Constitution. are, in general. 
to be treated as valid and binding.u2 
1 Hickman vs. Jones, 9 Wallace 197. 
2 Warren, II, 417. 
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c This decision, ot course, 'WaS greeted unfavorably by the Radical1l, as it 
was their contention that all the acts of the rebellious states were invalid. 
The pendulum. was swinging back, however, and the decision, which it given 
five years earlier would have been completely unacceptable, now elicited 
little critical comment. Although the decision might be interpreted as 
favorable to the Confederacy, the implied idea that the individual state had 
certain unalienable legislative rights,·made it acceptable to the majority of 
the people. 
Between the years 1870 and 1873 a number of decisions were handed down 
that elevated state at the expense of national authority. Thomson VB. Union 
Pacific ~., 9 Wallace 574, upheld the right of a state to tax a railroad 
although built with government funds and aoting as a government agent. 
Colleotor va. Day, 19 Wallace 113, in 1871, nullified a federal law that taxe 
the salaries of state officials in wartime. In 1873, Bradwell vs. !!:! State, 
16, Wallace 130, further limited the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship, and Osborne va. Mobile 16, Wallace 479, upheld a state tax on a 
company doing business partly outside of the state.3 Only in two deoisions 
did the Court uphold the power of the national government, one denying the 
right of a state court to issue a writ of habeas oorpus for a prisoner held 
---------.. -... --.. 
3 Warren, II, 534-6, 550-1 
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held by national authorities, and the other rejeoting repudiation oroontraots 
4 
and bonds by state oourts. 
This rebirth ot Court independenoe is best illustrated by deoisions in 
regard to national legislation. Up to 1869, only four Aots ot Congress had 
been deolared invalid in the whole history of the Court. From 1870 to 1873 
no less than six were 80 nullified. As Warren states: 
With the year 1873 ••• there came a 
distinct reaotion tram ••• extreme nation-
alism. That the Court' from 1870 to 1873 
was reoeding somewhat trom. the almost un-
varied support whioh it had theretotore 
given to Congressional power had been seen 
in the increased instanoes in whioh it had 
exeroised its funotion of deolaring Federal 
legislation to be violative ot the Consti-
tution.5 
After 1873 the trend toward independenoe remained. Within ten years, 
three of the most important Aots ot Congress oonoerning Federal and stat. 
relations were ruled unoonstitutional, the Enforoement Aot ot 1870, the Ku 
Klux Aot, and the Civil Rights Aot. Thus the Court re-est&blished itself. 
Co-inoident with the end ot the era was the death ot'Chiet Justioe Chase 
He passed away May 7, 1873, having lived long enough to see the Court begin 
to restore itself to its tormer eminenoe. His epitaphs were a review ot the 
whole period. The Nation spokeot him: "He brought to the Court no store of 
---------------
4 U.S. vs. Tarb1e, 13 Wa11aoe 397 (1872), Oloott vs. SUpervisors, 16 Wallaoe 
m (1873). This latter case came about through the praotioe ot various 
states to autliorlze money and bond issues tor munioipalities. These 
authorizations were generally upheld by the state oourts, but were often 
reversed at a later date by the oourts when, beoause of fraud or non-per-
for.mance, there was a publio demand for repudiation. 
5 Warren. II, 533. 
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• legal learning, but he brought oomprehensive views, oonsiderable power of 
generalization and a just sense of Constitutional rights and judioial 
responsibility.n6 His constant ene~, the Independent, gave grudging praise: 
Mr. Chase 'ftS an ambitious man, he wished to please people and gain their 
support, but he would not sacritice to this one jot of his conviotions.n7 
In retrospeot, the period fram 1860 to 1873 was undoubtedly the most 
diffioult in the history of the Supreme Court. Even during the early period 
of Court organization. the problems were not as acute. as the tribunal had 
not as yet been reoognized as the important arm it was eventually to beoome, 
and oould tbQs work out its diffioulties with a min~ of interferenoe. 
Furthermore. while it is true that the Court experienoed setbaoks under 
Jefferson and Jaokson, and as late as 1937 was under executive tire for re-
organization, all of these instanoes were disoonneoted and isolated problems. 
In the thirteen years of civil war and reoonstruction, however, the Court was 
constantly beset by legal and legislative diffioulties, without respite. It 
had oontinually to weigh its aotions, deoiding whether a legal problem or Aot 
of Congress would be more harmful to the oountry and to the body of law if 
aocepted, Or more harmful to the independent existenoe of the Court it 
rejected. 
In the opinion of this writer, the Supreme Court picked its way admirabl 
through the turbulent era, using its powers with disoretion when necessary, 
_ ...... _----------
6 Nation, Kay 15, 1873. 
7 Independent, May 15, 1873; oited in Warren, II, 552. 
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and holding them in abeyance when they might have endangered the judicial 
, 
character of the tribunal. The actions of the Court were not always fearless 
and undaunted but they accomplished their purpose. When the difficult tilles 
bad passed, the judiciary was still able to resume its former stature and 
continue to be Uthe bulwark of the Republio." 
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APPENDIX 
JUST ICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1860-1873 
Name State Service 
Roger Brooke Taney (O.J.) •• Md •• 1836-1864 
John MoLean •••••••••••••• Ohio •• 1829-1S61 
James Moore Wayne •••••••• Ga •••• 1S35-1867 
John Oatron •••••••••••••• Tenn •• 1837-1865 
P.ter Vivian Daniel •••••• Va •••• 1S41-1860 
Samuel Nelson •••••••••••• N.Y ••• lS45-1872 
Robert Oooper Gri.r •••••• Penn •• 1846-1870 
John Arohibald Oampbell.Ala •••• 1S53-l86l 
Nathan Olifford •••••••••• Me •••• 1S58-18Sl 
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Name State Service 
Salmon Portland Ohase (O.J.) •• Ohio •• 1864-1873 
Noah Haynes Swayne •••••••••••• Ohio •• 1S62-l8Sl 
no appointment 
no appointment 
Samuel Freeman Miller ••••••••• Iowa •• 1862-1S90 
Ward Hunt ••••••••••••••••••••• B.Y ••• 1872-1S82 
William Strong ••••••••• ~ •••••• Penn •• 1870-1880 
David Davi •••••••••••••••••••• I1l ••• l862-1S77 
Stephen Johnson Fie1d ••••••••• Oal ••• 1863-1897 
Joseph P. Bra4ley ••••••••••••• N.J ••• 1870-1892 
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